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I . INTRODUCTION
On January 8, 1976, Premier Zhou :alai of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) passed away, leaving the premiership of the State
Council of the nation vacant. One month later, on February 7, 1976,
the South China Morning Post of Xianggang (Hong Kong) reported that
Hua Guofeng had been appointed acting Prime P-'inister by Mao Zedong.1
The following day, a Reuters correspondent in Beijing asked the
Foreign Ministry of the PRC about the report. He received a six-
word comment from the Ministry : Mr. Hua Cuofeng is acting premier. 2
There was then no official announcement of the aopointrrent of
Hua uofeng as acting premier in the news dispatches of the New China
News Agency (NCUA) and the Rennin Ribao. The first official acknow-
ledgement of the apcointment in these official media a report on
February 7, 1976, by Nv1A saying that Acting Premier Hua Guofeng
met Venesuela's first ambassador to China. 3 This was the first time
hua Guofeng being addresed acting premier by the official organ
of the PRC. The Renmin Ribao gave the story front page coverage
2the following day.4 Similarly, the Beijing Review also gave prominent
display to the news.5
Then on April 7, 1976, two days after the Tien An Men incident,
the NCNA transmitted the resolution by the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that on the proposal of Mao Zedong,
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP unanimously
agreed to appoint Hua Guofeng first vice-chairman of the Central
Committee of the CCP and the premier of the State Council of the PRC.6
Another resolution adopted at the same time was to dismiss Deng
Xiaoping of all posts both inside and outside of the Chinese Communist
Party .7
On September 9, 1976, 1,,1ao Zedong passed away. In less than a
month, with the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four, Hua Cuofeng
was formally proclaimed Chairman of the Central Commiittee of the CCP.
The Gang of Four were arrested on October 6, 1976, but the
official announcement of the arrest did not aooear until two weeks
later, on October 21, 1976. when the announcement was True, it was
about the people's celebration of the events, not the announcement
of the events themselves. This first official report on the arrest
of the Gang of Four and the appointment of Hua as party chairman
appeared in the October 21 NCiv t dispatch:
3One and a half million joyous armymen and people
mounted a mammoth demonstration in Beijing today
to warmly celebrate Comrade Hua Guofeng being
the chairman of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China....They hailed the great
victory in shattering the scheme of the anti-
Party clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao,
Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan to usurp party and
state power....The Chinese capital was a scene of
revolutionary unity, militancy and joy of victory
today. From early in the morning, contingent after
contingent of workers, commune peasants, PLA
commanders and fighters, military men, revolutionary
cadres, revolutionary intellectuals, Red Guards,
representative of the neighbourhood communities
and people from all walks of life surged into Tien
An Men square from all directions.8
Though the news of the arrest of the Four was announced in
the newspapers on October 21, 1976, evidence showed that the news
of the arrest actually had spread across the country long before
the official oress announced the news. One such evidence was the
massive amount of dazibao indirectly and later directly critizing
the Gang of Four that appeard througout the country before the
official press announced the news.
It is true that the first hint that Hua Guofeng's position
might have been strengthened came in the morning of October 9, 1976
when the newspaper for the first time used the term Political
Bureau of the Central Committee headed by Hua Guofeng9 (emphasis
added). But then the first direct indication of Hua's becoming the
party chairman came from a dazibao posted in the afternoon of
October 9, 1976, in the centre of Beijing. The dazibao said: Hail
4the normination of comrade Hua Guofeng as the head of the Central
Committee of the CCP pf the People's Republic of China.10
And according to the AFP correspondent who first reported
about this dazibao, fresh slogans announcing the appointment of
Hua Guofeng as chairman of the Central Committee and of the Central
Committee Military Commission also appeared in outlying districts
of Beijing later the same afternoon. These posters, numbering about
one hundred, said that Premier Hua Guofeng had been Unanimously
elected chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.
During the following days, more and more dazibao appeared,
reflecting the increasing momentum of the dazibao campaign. And by
October 13, 1976, not just the news of the appointment had spread
throughout the nation, people actually had started celebrating the
appointment. According to stories told by foreign travellers to an
AFP correspondent, several thousands of people marched through the
streets in Hangzhou and Hunan on October 13, 1976 ringing gongs and
beating drums to mark the appointment of Chairman Mao's successor
despite the fact that the appointment had not been announced by the
official media. 12
Another initiative taken by the dazibao was to denounce sharply
by name the then Party Deputy Chairman Wang Hongwen and three other
radical Political Bureau members, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and
5Yao Wenyuan. This was the first time the dazibao censured the radical
leaders by name. Indeed, it was also the first time the radical leaders
were openly criticized. These dazibao, numbering hundreds according
to a Kyodo correspondent, called for the overthrow of Wang and three
others. Some denounced the group of anti-Party plotters Jiang, Wang,
Zhang and Yao."13 Dazibao of this nature were reported to have appeared
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at least in Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan.
Though dazibao sometimes can be a rather sensitive indicator
of the political atmosphere in China as well as a weapon for criticism,
it is not a very efficient and effective medium for the rapid transmission
of information by itself. There is reason to believe that people in
other parts of the country did not get the news of the appointment
from the dazibao in Beijing. Somehow there must be other channels to
disseminate the news. One of them probably was the closely-knitted
inter-personally network of communication built upon various organizations,
communes, and the revolutionary committees. The Daily Telegraph of
London, which later was the first newspaper to report the arrest of
the Four, reported on October 12, 1976, that Political organizers
in factories and neighbourhood units were told of the arrest at special
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weekend briefings. Apparently, one of the purposes of these special
briefings was to instruct these political organizers how to relate the
news to the members of the various political organizations they were
attached to. And probably political organizers in other parts of the
country were given similar briefings by responsible local senior cadres.
6On October 13, the Taibei Central News Agency gave a similar
report: A notice, dubbed 'Document No. 15' was sent to lower Communist
organizations, urging local cadres to support the decision (of the
appointment of Hua Guofeng to the Party chairmanship). 16 And on the
day of the official news release of the arrest, an AFP correspondent
reported that The entire population has been 'briefed' during secret
meetings organized throughout the country over the past two weeks.r17
While the news of the arrest of the Four and the appointment
of Hua to the chairmanship was sweeping throughout the country, the
official newspapers had remained silent over the change at the top
leadership level. Nevertheless, a closer look at the newspaper contents
during the period does reveal some hints concerning the drastic
change at the country's leadership level.
A salient feature one immediately notices when reading the
Chinese newspapers during this period was the big headlines calling
the whole nation to Unite under the Chinese Communist Party headed
by comrade Hua Guofeng Feng. Furthermore, there was a sudden shift
in the press coverage of some of the Mao Zedong quotes. We know that
after the arrest of the Four, one of the charges levied on them was
that they had forged Chairman Mao's last words. In the core of this
charge was the question over Mao's instruction of Act according
to the principles laid down.
7The Renmin Ribao on December 17, 1976, published an editorial
giving the official interpretation and account of how the Four
had forged this Mao's instruction. According to that editorial, the
original Mao's instruction was intended for Hua Guofeng. The
instruction said: Take your time, don't be anxious and Act in
line with the past principles. However, the mass media, then
controlled' by the ,Gang of Four, changed this to Act according to
the principles laid down. 18 The editorial said that the aim of
the Four was to deliberately create a fake in an attempt to pass
the instruction off as an invincible Mao Zedong Thought and brandish
it as their weapon to usurp Party and state power. They tried to give
the people of the whole nation an impression that Party Central
Comr:ii•ttee headed by Gua Guofeng had concealed Chairman Mao's last
words from the public and that they alone were the true propagandists
and defenders of the last words.
Whether this editorial's account of the Four's intention was
true or false, we don't know. However, a survey of the Renmin Ribao
and Guangming Ribao during the period did reveal that during'.-the
period immediately before the arrest. of the Four, the newspapers
had made a lot of references to the directive of Act according tc
the principles laid down. The number of articles making references
to this theme reached a maximum on September 20, 1976, in both the
Renmin Ribao and the Guangming Ribao. On that day, the Renmin Ribao
carried 30 stories while the Guangming Ribao carried 34 stories
making references to this quote.
8If the press coverage of the quote Act according to the
principles laid down reflects the Four's influence over the press,
the the press coverage of another Mao's quotes, Three do's and three
don'ts, may be indicative of Hua Guofeng's influence over the press.
The Renmin Ribao December 17, 1976, editorial said that the principle
of hee do's and three don'ts was repeatedly stressed by Mao Zedong
when criticizing the Gang of Four. It argued:
Precisely because of this, they looked upon the
quote of 'Three do's and three don'ts as some-
thing that meant their doom. While raising The
principles laid down to a very high plane that
would frighten people to death, they tried
in a thousand and one ways to resist and
oppose the three basic principles Chairman
Mao had enunciated. In September this year
when the Party Central Committee was drafting
the memorial speech to be delivered by comrade
Hua Guofeng, the Gang of Four went so far as
to oppose the inclusion of he Three do's and
three don'ts in the text.19
A survey of the press during the three-week period immediatel:
before the arrest of the Four showed that the Renmin Ribao'only
printed a total of seven stories making reference to the quote
Three do's and three don'ts, while the Guangming Ribao printed
nine.
But during the three weeks-after the arrest of the Four, the
Renmin Ribao printed a total of 184 stories making references to
the quote, and the Guangming Ribao carried 198.
9So, besides learning of the news of Hua's appointment from
the dazibao and being briefed by the cadres on the appointment, the
Chinese people were at the same time exposed to repeated messages
from the newspapers saying that somebody had intrigued and conspired,
and that they should unite under the Party headed by Hua Guofeng to
fight against the plotters.
Table 1 is a brief comparision of the contents of dazibao
and the newspapers during that period.
Besides the newspapers, many of the magazines were also in
the hands of the Four and their supporters before the Four were arrested.
After the arrest of the Four, there is reason to believe that the
editorial departments of these magazines had to re-orient themselves
or that they had to be re-organized altogether in order to publish
articles in line with the policy of the new leadership and to denounce
the radical leaders whom these magazines previously so strongly supported.
A survey of selected Chinese national magazines available in
Xianggang showed that these magazines were not issed during the transition
period when the Four had been arrested but the news of the arrest were
not yet announced in the newspapers. Table 2 shows the dates of issue
of these magazines.
TABLE 1
CONTENTS OF NEWSPAPER AND TATZ1 AO IMMEDIATELY BEFORE AND AFPER THE ARREST OF THE GANG OF FOUR
DATE NEVSPAPER TATZEPAO
EPT. 15- Dominant theme: Act according to the
ct.4, 1976 principles laid down
ct. 5 Act according to the principles laid
down" completely disappeared
Ct. 6 (Gang of Four arrested)
Publication of the Selected Works ofct. 9 A tatzepao in Beijing: Hail the nomination
Mao Zhedong Vol. 5 will be directly of Hua Guofeng as the head of the Central
under the Political Bureau of the CCP Committee of the CCP
Central Committee headed by Comrade
Hua Guo f eng About 100 tatzepao in outlying districts of
Beijing said Hua had been elected Chai r:nan
ct. 11 Theme: Unite under the CCP headed by
Comrade Hua Guofeng Tatzepao appeared in other major cities announcing
the appointment of Hurt as Chairman of CCP
ct. 12 Dominant theme: Three do's and three Newspaper's silence over Ijua's appointment
don'ts challenged and questioned by tatzepao
Hua still addressed as premier
ct . 15 Hundreds of tatzepao denounced Tang Hongwen, ZhangTheme: Three do's and three don'ts and
Chunqiao, JiangintT and Lao. enurin by nameto Struggle against plotters
ct. 16-21 Tatzepao denouncing the Gang of Four by nameTheme: "Struggle against plotters
Strugle against those who forged appeared throughout the nation
Mao Zhedong's directives
Tatzepao demanded the execution of the Gang of Four
ct. 22 Arrest of the Gang of Your and the
appointment of Hua announced in the newspaper
ct. 25 Theme: 11Nith you in charge, I am at ease
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TABLI 2
DATE OF PUBLICATION OF 3 LCT ) MAGAZINES AVAILABLE IN XIANGANG
IMMEDIATELY BEYOREIIJ AND AFTER TH: AiR_? T 0 ' THE FOUR
Magazine Before arrested After arre:3t announcedTransition period
Vol. Vol.Vol.Date issued Date issued Date issued
Lian Huan Hua Bao Sept. 1976 Nov. 1976Vol. 10, 11Vol. 9
(Joint issue)
Vol. l0Hongqi Sept. 23, 1976 Vol. 11 Nov. 1, 1976
Renmin Dianying Oct. 27, 1976Sept. 27, 1976 Vol. 6Vol. 5
Renmin Hua Bao Nov. 1976Sept. 1976 vol. 10 oct. 1976 Vol. 11Vol. 9
(circulation limited)
Rennin Yinyue NOV. 30, 1976Sept. 30, 1976 Vol. 6Vol. 5
Rennin Xiju undatedSept. 25, 1976 Vol. 6Vol. 5
Xuexi Yu Pipan Sept. 14, 1976Vol. 9
Vol. '42Vol. 41Beijing revie Vol. 44 Oct. 29, 1970oct. 8, 1976 Oct. 15,
1976
Vol. 43 Oct. 22,
1976
After the arrest of the Four, the Xuexi Yu Pipan terminated publication, so the September 14 is:-ue was
the last issue of the magazine.
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The table indicates that with the exception of the Beijing Review,
none of the listed magazines was issued during the transition period.
Beijing Review is different because it is a weekly, so it can be taken
over and re-edited more easily. Furthermore, Beijing Review is basically
an English translation of the major news stories published in the official
newspapers for the week. It contains nothing original. It simply
published what the Party newspapers said. But for other magazines, they
were not meant to carry news stories. Thus, the selection of material
during this transition period was a rather delicate matter. If these
magazines had continued the editorial policy as before,. the articles
might not be in line with the expectation of the new leadership. On
the other hand, at a time when the Party newspapers were still silent,
it would not be appropriate for these magazines to disclose the change
at the top leadership level.
The result of this dilemma was that these magazines were not
issued during the transition period. Renmin Dianying (People's Cinema)
and Renmin (People's Theater) were published at the end of each
month, explaining why they were not issued during the transition period
in the middle of October. But for Liang Huan Hua Bao (Serialized
Picture), the Honggi (Red Flag), and Renmin Hua Bao (People's Pictorial),
there was a delay in publication. For Lian Huan Hua Bao, the October
issue was delayed for a whole month and came out as a joint issue with
the November 1976 issue. For Xuexi Yu Pipan (Study and Criticism), after
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the arrest of the Gang of Four, it was terminated altogether. And up
to the writing of this paper, it has not reappeared. Another magazine
that deserves attention is the Renrnin Hua Bao. The October issue was
published, but it was of limited circulation and was not accessable to
overseas readers. So, what was printed in the magazine was not known.
We only know that later when the November issue came out, it was devoted
to reporting the life of the late Chairman Iao as well as the nation's
mourning-of his death, but the pictures and names of the radical leaders
had all disappeared as if they had never showed up at Mao Zedong's
furneral.20
With the massive dazibao campaign, the briefing sessions, the
sudden shift in the press emphasis on Mao Zedong quotes, and the delay
in these magazines' publication, one would suggest that before
the official press announced the news of the arrest of the Four and
the appointment of Hua to the chairmanship, a concerted effort was
already underway to set the stage for the official announcement
of the drastic change at the top leadership level.
However, unlike Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Hua Guofeng does not
have a very outstanding and popular image among the Chinese people
at that time 21 Furthermore, since the Cultural Revolution, the
Propaganda Department of the CCP had been dominated by the radicals
22
and their supporters. So, prior to the arrest of the Gang of Four,
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the radicals had always been used the media to their advantage. They
were said to have always conscientiously played down Hua Guofeng and
played up members of the radical group.23 Thus, Hua Guofeng's image
had not been popularized very much even after his appointment as
premier of the State Council in April 1976. With his unpopularized
public image, one of the jobs awaiting Hua Guofeng and his supporters
after his proclamation as party chairman must necessarily be the
establishment of,Hua's image and the legitimization of his leadership
position.
The present study attempts to find out what the Chinese press
has done in its attempts to popularize Hua Guofeng's image and
legitimize his leadership position. Since the case of Hua Guofeng is
unique in the history of PRC, findings generated from this study may
not be generalizable to other situations. But the media activities
consequential to this unique case did provide a good opportunity to
examine the communication acts of PRC during drastic political changes.
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II. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR LEGITIMACY
According to David Easton, in any nation, the most stable
support from the members to the regime will derive from the
conviction on the part of the members that it is right and proper
for him to obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements
of the regime.1 In other words, the most stable form of support
to a regime will result from the inculcation of a sense of
legitimacy in the members by the leading elite. In the case of Hua
Guofeng, the inculcation of a sense of legitimacy in the Chinese
people is of special urgency because of the abruptness of his
emergence.
Most of the theories on legitimacy and legitimization are
originated from the Nest. Given the unique sociocultural and
political conditions in China, these theories may not be entirely
applicable to the present study. On the other hand, there is no
comprehensive and recognized paradigm for the analysis of political
culture in general and legitimacy in particular for China. The
absence of systematic discussion of the Chinese concept of
16
legitimacy has been pointed out by Zhao Lingyang in his book
entitled Legitimacy of Governments in China,2 which deals
specifically with the question of legitimacy in traditional China
up to the Qing Dynasty. Zhao observed that though the concept of
legitimacy varied from one regime to another in traditional China,
yet the objective for having a sense of legitimacy is the same:
to stress that the ruling regime is great and that it is proper
for that regime to rule.3
Zhao's treatise on legitimacy in traditional China is rather
systematic. However, his approach is more descriptive than
analytical. Thus it does not provide a satisfactory solution
to the problem of having no adequate analytical framework for the
study of the question of legitimacy caused by the death of Mao
Zedong and the rise of Hua Guofeng in China.
In an attempt to solve this problem of lack of adequate
theoretical framework guiding the=study, a general analytical
scheme for the concept of legitimacy derived by David Easton is
adopted. Easton differentiates the concept of legitimacy into
three aspects: ideological legitimacy, personal legitimacy, and
structural legitimacy.4 Then, for the purpose of the present study,
special indicators for each of these three types of legitimacy
are sought. The indicators were arrived at with consideration of
the uniqueness of Hua Guofeng's case as well as the sociocultural
and political conditions in China.
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Types of Legitimacy
According to Easton, there are three general types of legitimacy:
ideological legitimacy, personal legitimacy, and structural legitimacy.
These three types of legitimacy have different sources, which are
respectively, ideological source, personal source, and structural
source.
Ideological Source of Legitimacy
According to Easton, ideological legitimacy is basically
the political ends, purposes, and preferences of all the members
of the system, including the leadership, as related to the system
as a whole. It also encompasses the sets of ideals which help
the members of the system to interpret the past, explain the present
and offer a vision of the future. Some ideological positions
may be relevant only to the competition among the political
leaders for the positions of authority in a regime, while others
may reflect the political parties' genuine policy committment and
difference. For the case of China, one major ideological conflict
has been the struggle between the radical line of politics on
the one hand and the pragmatic line on the other. What precisely
the differences between these two lines are would not be dealt
with in this study,. suffice here to note that they represent
two conflicting ideological and policy positions adopted by two
political groups within the Chinese Communist Party. These
contending beliefs contribute to the divisive force in a
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system and may affect the confidence of the members in the
authorities and the regime, and thus affect the ideological
aspect of legitimacy as discussed by Easton.
Personal Source of Legitimacy
Easton asserts that whether or not the authorities in a
system-will be considered right and proper may depend not on
their conformity to an accepted regime but upon the extent to
which the members see the occupants of authority roles as
personally, in their behavior and symbolism, worthy of moral
approval. Sometimes it is possible for the authorities to
violate the norms and prescribed procedures of the regime and to
ignore its regular structural arrangement. Yet, if the members
see the new authorities as personally trustworthy, concerned, or
called to lead, in Weberian terms, the legitimacy of the
authorities is not denied. This is what Easton termed personal
source of legitimacy.5
Structural Source of Legitimacy
Besides ideological and-personal sources, a sense of legitimacy
may also arise from the fact that the existence of the regime and
the authorities is already an established fact. In Easton's words,
Regardless of how a belief in the legitimacy of the regime
arises, once it has become an established fact, it will produce
independent effects as it concerns the acceptability of the
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authorities."6 If the members are convinced of the legitimacy of
the regime, those authorities who came to power through that
regime would acquire a certain degree of legitimacy independent
of other factors.
A further aspect of structural source of legitimacy is that
regardless of the varied motives for believing in the legitimacy
of a regime, the fact of such a belief in itself constitute
grounds upon which day-to-day authorities may be considered
legitimate. Under those conditions in which existing structure
and norms are accepted over time, they will be effective to some
important degree in contributing to the legitimacy of the, persons
who operate within them.
Structural legitimacy has special bearing in the case of
Hua Guofeng. For ideological source and persoanl source of
legitimacy, a certain period of time is needed to inculcate the
sense of legitimacy in the members. But for structural legitimacy,
the legitimizing effect is more immediate. The de facto leaders
would to a certain extent be regarded as the legitimate leaders
no matter how familiar of unfamiliar the leaders are. In view
of the abruptness of Hua Guofeng's emergence, structural source
would be a very important contributing factor towards the building
of Hua Guofeng's legitimacy, especially for the period immediately
after his rise to the top leadership.
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Mao 7edong as a Source of Legitimacy
After the Cultural Revolution, MaoZedong's image had
become more and more embeded in myth. At the height of Mao
cult, Mao Zedong's words and instructions represented ultimate
truth to many of the people in China. He was perceived as
invincible and infallible. The following account in Wenwei
Bao reflects vividly the almost religious attitude held by
the Chinese people towards Mao Zedong:8
Every morning at sun-rise, PLA soldiers,
Red guards, and workers 'vent to Tien An
Men. They came in orderly groups and full
of vigor and vitality, they stood on the
Golden later Bridge facing the bright
sunshine of early day. With a serious
and respectful attitude they sought daily
daily instructions from a spiritually-
present Chairman Mao. At evening they
would return to Tien An Men to report to
Chairman Mao their new achievement in
grasping revolution and promiting
production.
Since ao Zedong was able to exert such a great influence
to China's politics and among the Chinese people, so, in this
study, it is assumed that Pao Zedong constituted a distinct
source that could enhance the legitimacy of Hua Guofeng in
addition to ideological, porsonal, and structural. source of
legitimacy. Or at least, we can assume that Hua Guofeng's
supporters would think that Mao Zedon 's symbol could he
utilized to enhance the legitimacy of iiua Guofeng. This might
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might explain why immediately after the arrest of.the Gang of
Four, Mao Zedong's directive of With you (Hua Guofeng) in
charge, I am at ease was played big by the mass media in China.
Therefore, for this study, Mao Zedong is also taken as a source
of legitimacy.
Thus we have the following analytical scheme:
Legitimacy of
Hua Guo f eng
Ideological Personal Structural Mao Zedong
Source Source Source as a Source
One point that should be noted is that Easton's scheme at
best is just an analytical tool to help understand the concept of
legitimacy and the process of the legitimization of Hua Guofeng.
The adoption of the scheme does not require us to assume that when
Hua Guofeng's supporters were attempting to project Hua's image
to the population they actually had these four sources of legitimacy
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in their mind. Indeed Hua Guofeng's supporters and the media
leaders in China might have an entirely different conception as
to the projection of their leader's image, or that they might just
do what they've been doing in the past without consciously under-
standing why. In any case, attempts to probe into the media leaders'
intention would necessitate a direct assessment of their psyche,
which is beyond the scope of this study. However, we assume that
any information the media leaders printed, reported, or broadcast
about the new leader would represent a message to the people and
be registered, and that the result of these message aggregate
would chart the people's perception of the new leader. A leader
would be viewed by the people from many dimensions, and for the
dimensions of legitimacy,. aston's scheme is adopted to help
analyze the process systematically and with perspective.
Mao Zedong's Quotes
Easton's scheme provides the framework based upon which all
the main themes associated with -Hua Guofeng in the sampled news-
paper issues would be analyzed. But besides the themes associated
with Hua Guofeng, all direct quotations of Mao Zedong in these
newspapers would be analyzed. The reason being that Mao Zedong
was still a symbol of authority after his de,ith. At least shortly
after his death, many of his sayings were still widely quoted
in the newspapers. And since Mao Zedong had said so many things
during his lifetime, so the gate-keepers of the media can always
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select the ones that are in line with the prevailing political
atmosphere of the time. Thus the inclusion of Mao Zedong's quotes
in the analysis would shed light on how the media leaders utilize
these quotes to justify the new leadership.
Actually, to study the legitimization of Hua Guofeng, only
Mao Zedong's quotes that were associated with Hua Guofeng should
be analyzed. But then, the analysis of all the Mao's quotes that
appeared in the sampled issues could give a more complete picture
of the nature of Mao Zedong's quotes in the newspapers, hence
it would enable us to know more about how the media leaders
had utilized Mao Zedong's quotes to establish a favorable political
atmosphere to make the Chinese people-accept the.drastic change
at the country's top leadership level. Therefore, all Mao Zedong's
quotes that appeared in the sampled issues of newspapers were
analyzed.
III. METHODOLOGY
To analyse the Chinese attempts to legitimize Hua Guoferg,
the contents of the Chinese press before and after Hua Guofeng
became the Party chairman were studied.
Easton s analytical scheme described in Chapter 2 provides
the basic framework for the analysis of the newspaper contents
Based uoon this scheme, indicators for the four sources of
legitimacy are derived and operationalized. Coding categories,
coding sheets and coding instructions are thn designed, they
provide a standardized approach for the coders to analyze the
newspaper contents.
The Media Selected for Analysis
For this study, the Renmin Ribao and Suangmong Ribao were
selected and analyzed to illustrate how the press was utilized
to legitimize Hua Guofeng. However other primary and secondary
sources were also consulted.
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Renmin Ribao and Guangming Ribao were selected for analysis
for several reasons. Firstly, these two were the only newspapers
allowed sale outside China until late 1978 when some regional
newspaper were also allowed to be sold outside China. Furthermore,
the Ren.min Ribao is the most authoritative national newspaper in
China. It publishes and interprets the decisions taken by the
Party and government authorities. its important editorials are
often distributed as study rra aerial in pamphlets.1 And since it is
in a commanding position, analysis of it can give a general idea
as to the contents of other newspapers and rass media because of
the similarity among the Chinese media contents that grows from
the political control and the lack of an adversary press.2
Period of Study
The period of study is from January 1, 1976, to December 31,
1978, covering three years. This Period Is selected because 1976
was the year a series of .a jor events Mich charted China's soli tical
develocment took place. These events included the death of Premier
zhou Enlai on January 8, 1976 the Tien An Men Incident on
April 1X76 the death of ,ao Zedon on September 9, 1976 and
the arres of the Hang of sour on October 6, 1976. Each of these
events was also directly related to the rise of Hua Guofeng. The
death of zhou Enlai ied to the appointment of Hua Guofeng as the
acting premier. The An Men Incident precipitated the appoint
ment of Hua Guofeng as premier and the first vice-chairman of the
chinese Communist party. And the deeth of Mao Zedong and the
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subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four ushered in the rise of
Hua uofeng as the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party.
December 31, 1978, was selected as the end of the period
because this was the day set by the new leadership as the conclusion
of major political struggles against followers of the Gang of Four.
After December 31, 1973, major emphasis of the work of the government
would be placed on the Four Modernizations.3
Sampling
The period of study covers three years, totaling 156 weeks.
From each of these 156 weeks, one issue of newspaper was sampled.
The Renmin Ribao and the Haan ming ?ibao were sampled on an
alternate basis. I-t was arbitrarily determined that the first
week of each year be sampled from the Renmin Ribao, the second
week from the 6uan Ming Ribao, the third week again from the
Renmin Riboa and so on. In total, 81 issues of Renmin Ribao
and 78 issues of Guangiming Ribao were sampled.
A random nimber table was used to determine the day of the
week on which these newspapers were sampled. This was done by
selecting at random a single-digit number from a random number
table. If the number obtained was "one", then the Monday issue of
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the newspaper would be sampled for that particular week if the
number was seven, then the Sunday issue would be used and so
on. If the number obtained was zero or greater than seven, then
it would be discarded and another number would be read from the
table until a number ranging from one to seven was ontained. The
process was repeated until all the newspaper in the three-year
period were exhausted.
The sample issues of newspapers were rather evenly distributed
over the seven days. With 23 issues for Monday, 24 issues for
Tuesday, 23 issues for Wednesday, 23 issues for Thursday, 26
issues for Friday, 20 issues for Saturday, and 20 issues for Sunday,
The Method of Analysis
The technique selected for analyzing the sampled newspapers
was the contingency method, which is a form of content analysis
method developed and elaborated by Osgood. Osgood contends that
An inference about the 'association structure' of a source --
ghat leads to what in his thinking -- may be made from the contingency
(or co-occurence) of symbols in the content of a message.4He
further says that:
If there is any content analysis technique
which has a defensible psychological rationale
it is the contingency method. It is anchored to
the principles. of association....It seems rea-
sonable to assume that greater-than-chance
contingencies of items in mess a,res would be
indicative of associations in the thinking
04 the source. 5
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for the present study, we are interested to know what the
media leaders did in their attempts to legitimize and build up the
image of Hua Guofeng, therefore we can apply the reasoning of
the contingency method and analyze the contingencies between
the term Hua Guofeng (or substitude of it, such as Chairman
Hua) and other items or themes. That is, whenever the name Hua
Guofeng appears in the newspapers, the main theme associated
with it was analyzed. These themes were classified according
to the framework for the analysis of legitimacy derived by
David Easton.
By analyzing all the themes that are associated with Hua
Guofeng in the newspaper, and by placing these themes into the
framework for the analysis of legitimacy, we then would be able
to make some observations concerning the legitimization of Hua
uuofeng by the newspapers in China during the period under study.
Thus, for this study, the unit of analysis being the references
to Hua Guofeng in the sampled newspapers. All news stories, articles,
and corn enti-ries, except purely foreign news, in the sampled
newspapers were analyzed.Purely foreign news was not analyzed
because it has nothing to do with China and contained no reference
to Hua Guofeng,so the coders were not asked to code these
purely foreign news stories.
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Unit of Analysis
The units of analysis are references to Hua Guofeng and
Mao Zedong's quotes. That is, whenever the name Hua Guofeng
(or substitutes for it, such as Chairman Hua or Comrade Hua
Guofeng) appears in the newspapers, it is taken as one
reference and analyzed. Similarly, whenever Mao Zedong's saying
or directive were quoted in the newspaper, it is taken as one
reference to Mao's quote and analyzed.
Legitimacy of Hua Guofeng
The analytical scheme adopted in this study provides for
four general sources of legitimacy. They are, respectively,
ideological source, personal source, structural. source and
Mao Zedong as a source of legitimacy. For each of the
ideological, personal, and structural sources of legitimacy,
two categories of indicators were set. And for Mao Zedong as
a source of legitimacy, one category of indicators was set.
Thus we have altogether seven categories of indicators
for the analysis of legitimacy of Hua Guofeng. Whenever the
name Hua Guofeng appears in the newspapers, then the main
theme associated with it is analyzed to see which of the
seven categories fit it best. The seven categories of indicators
are listed below.
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A. Ideological Sources of Legitimacy
1. Hua Guofeng associated with themes or symbols of pragmatic
politics such as those concerning the Four Modernizations
2. Hua Guofeng associated with themes or symbols of radical
politics such as those stressing the continuation of
class struggle, revolution, etc.
B. Personal Sources of Legitimacy
1. Hua Guofeng associated with themes or symbols concerning
his personal qualities
2. Hua Guofeng associated with the Chinese people, whether
it be about Hua Guofeng's concern for the people or
the people's admiration of Hua Guofeng
C. Structural Sources of Legitimacy
1. Hua Guofeng associated with Party or State head activities.
For example he received foreign guests in his capacity
as the Chairman of the C}i nese Communist Party
2. Hua Guofeng associated with the theme of,.the smash of the
Gang of Four and thus saved the Party and the state
D. Mao Zedong as a Source of Legitimacy
Under this category are all the references to Hua Guofeng which
associate him with Mao Zedong. For example, the statement that
Comrade Hua Guofeng was personally chosen by our late
Chairman Mao to success the chairmanship.
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Thus, whenever the name Hue Guofeng was refered to in the
newspapers, the main theme associated with Hua was analyzed
to see under which of the above seven categories that
particular reference should be classified. Each reference
to Hua Guofeng can be placed in one and only one of these
seven categories.
Those references to Hua Guofeng which could not be reasonably
classified under the above categories were placed under the
category Others.
Mao Zedong's Quotes
Besides analyzing the main themes associated with each
reference to Hua Guofeng, all direct quotations of Mao Zedong
in the newspapers analyzed were coded. Each direct quotation
of Mao Zedong's saying or directive was analyzed and then
placed in one of the following three categories:
A . Quotes which are pragmatic in nature. For example, Mao
Zedong's saying that The Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution has continued for eight years. Now it is better
to have stbility.
B. Quotes which are radical in nature. For example, Mao
Zedong's saying that Continue the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution till the end.
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C. Quotes which are neutral or which cannout suitably be
analyzed along the pragmatic-radical dichotomy. For
example, Mao Zedong's saying that People, and the people
alone, is the motive force in.the making ot.the world
history."|
Based upon this coding scheme, the 159 sampled issues of
newspapers were coded.
Coder and Inter-coder Reliability
The 159 sampled issues of newspapers were coded by a group
of second year Journalism students of the Chinese University
of Hong Kong. To ensure coding reliability, the following steps
were taken:
1. The coders were explained in great detail the objective,
theory, rationale and design of the study, including the theory
on legitimacy.and the contingency method so as to give them
a clear idea of what the study was about
2. Before coding, the coding instructions were explained
to the coders in detail. They were explained not only the
coding procedures but also the principles underlying the
coding so that their judgement would be more accurate, or,
at least, more uniform;
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3. A trial coding was administered before the coders
actually started coding the sampled issues. At the end of the
trial coding, a round-up session was held to discuss the
differences among the coders and other problems arising from
the coding until all the coders understood why each item should
be coded in that way. This process helped eliminate individual
differences in the interpretations of the coding instructions
4. The writer was accompanying the coders whenever they
were doing the coding. They discussed with the writer
whenever they had any doubt or query in coding.
It should be noted that the coding instructions were written
in Chinese--the language in which the newspapers analyzed were
printed. The above is only a summary presenting the main points
of the coding scheme. The original Chinese Version of the Coding
Instructions is included as Appendix B.
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VI. FINDINGS
In the 159 issues of newspapers analyzed, a total of 3.750
references were made to Hua Guofeng, and Mao Zhedong's sayings
were quoted directly for 1,499 times. Thus, on the average,
Hus uofeng was mentioned 23.5 times and Mao Zhedong's sayings
were quoted for 9.4 times in each issue of newspaper printed
during the period under study. These 3,750 references to Hua
Guofeng were calssified into eight catexories :
1. Hua Guofeng associated with themes or symbols of
pragmatic politics;
2. Hua Guofeng associated with themes or symbols of
radical politics;
3. Hua Guofeng associated with themes or symbols of
concerning his personal qualities;
4. Hua Guofeng associated with Chinese people;
5. Hua Guofeng associated with Farty or state head
activities;
6. Hua Guofeng associated with the themes of the smash of
the Gang of Four;
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7. Hua Guofeng associated with Mao Zedong;
8. Hua Guofeng associated with themes or symbols that
cannot be placed under the above categories.
On the other hand, the 1,499 quotations of Mao Zedong's
sayings were also classified into three categories:
1. Quotes that are pragmatic in nature;
2. Quotes that are radical in nature;
3. Quotes that are neither pragmatic nor radical in nature.
Thus, altogether we have eleven categories. Figure 1 shows
the average number of references to each of these eleven categories
ner sampled issue during the study period.
We notice that Hua Guofeng was most frequently associated
with Party and state head activities daring the period. A typical
case in this category was the reference to Hua Gofeng in the
statement Chairman Hua meets delegation of the Central Committee
of the U.S. Communist Party.1 In references like this, Hua
Gucfeng was potrayed as the de facto leader performing Party
and state head activities. This kind of associations between
Hua Guofeng and Party and state head activities alone account
for 1,463 (39 %) of the total 3,750 references to Hua Guofeng
in the sampled is ues during the period studied.
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FIGURE1-- AVERAGENUMBEROF REFERENCESTO HUAGUOFENG'SASSOCIATIONSWITH INDICATORSOF LEGITIMACY
ANDTO MAOZHE ONG'SQUOTESIN ONEISSUE OF NEWSPAPER
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Second-most frequently associated with Hua Guofeng were
symbols of pragmatic politics, which account for 765 (20.4 %)
of the total references to Hua Cuofeng. The majority of these
associations were centred around development news and the
Four Modernizations. For example, references to Hua Gao t eng
such as Chairman Hua puts forward the task to deepen the
mass movement to learn from Dazhai in agriculture and to learn
from Jawing in industry and strive to push forward the national
economy forward. 2 Also, references to Hua Guofeng in
statements like Chairma..n Hua pointed out that it is a
strategic policy decision by the Central Committee of the CCP
to acreive stability and unity in our country,3 More common
examples were the concluding paragraphs of r.,a- ny news stories
and articles which habitually ended by saying things like
"... and we will follow Chairman ::ua to realize the :Our
Modernizations."
Hua Guofeno' s association with the Chinese people comes
the third. it accounts for 371 (9.9 ) of the total references
to Hua. A typioal case in this cotegory is the reference to
Hua Cuofeng in the staement v"Chairman Hua showed his genuine
care and concern for the pecple during his visit to pangshan
4
after the earthquke."
The frequency of Hua duofeng's association with Hao Zedong
comes fourth. It sceouts for 360(9.6%)of the totul reforences
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to Hua Guofeng. Under this category were references to Hua
like Comrade HuaGuofeng's becoming our Party leader was
the briliant decision of Chairman Mao, 5 and that Comrade
Hua Guofeng was personally chosen by Chairman Mao to succeed
6
the chairmanship. "
The frequency of Hua Guofeng's associations with the
Gang of Four comes rather close to that of Hua's association
with Mao Zed'ong.However, the nature of the associations was
different. Hua Guofeng's associations with the Gang of Four
were usually in the for: of stressing that it was Hua Guofeng
who smashed the anti-Party clique of the Gang of Four. Or that
it was Hua uofen g who saved the Party and the state by struggling
against the 'our's attempt to usurp Party and state power.
For example, The whole Party, whole army, and the whole country
will forever remember Comrade Nue. Guofeng's great deed of
smashin t e Gan of Four. 7 or omrade Hua .Guo:enig Smashed e
Gang of Four in one stroke, an JA thus saved the ?evolution and
saved the party."8 References to Hua uofe g like these account
for 352 (9.4%)of the total references to :tua Guofen in the
sampled newspapers.
Next comes Hua Guofeng's associations with themes concorning
his personal qualities. For example, reference to Hua Guofeng in
the statement saying that "Comrade Hua Guofeng is democratic
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in his style of work, unassuming and ap.roachable, good at
uniting Awi th comrades to work together."9 And that Hua Guoferg
had underwent long tests, amassed a wealth of experiences and
had now proved he could handle Party and state issues under
difficult and complex circumstances. 10This kind of references
to Hua Goof ens account for 184 (4.9 %) of the total references
to Hua in the sampled newspapers.
Following this category were references to Hua Guof eng
which could not be placed in any of the seven categories.
A1togethIer, they account for 176(4.7 %) of the total references
to iua. rn exam-ole of this is a statement saying that "Hua
Guofeng joint the Chinese Cornmunist Party when he was very
young."
As can be seen from figure 1, the ccategory that appeared
least frequently was Hua Guofeng's association with radical
politics. This category account for only 79 (2.1%) of the
total references to Hua Guiofeng. And among these 2.1% of
Hua's assoctions with themes or stmbols of radical politics,
most of them were habitual statements that appeared once or
so in some of the articles. Hor example, in an article entitled
A politioal stroggle concerning theories in natural sciences,"
there was a statement saying "Under the leaderhisp of Cnasirman
Hua, eiucation and scienific research will continoe to serve
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the proletariat politics.11 Another example under this
category was the news stroy on an article by Hua Guofeng
entitled Continue the revolution under the dictatorship of
the proletariat to the end. 12
Wile for the 1,499 Mao Zedong's quotes, the findings
show that those pragmatic in nature occured most frequently,
accounting for 37.5 % of the total r-: ferences to Mao Zedong's
quotes. Quotes that are radical in nature comes second with
32.5 %. Mao Zedong's quotrs that are neither radical nor
pragmatic accounted for the remaining 30 % of the 1,1+99
references to Mao Zedong's quotes.
These figures might give an impression that there was. no
significant difference between the occurenece of Mao Zedong's
pragmatic quotes and radical quotes in the newspapers. But once
when the time factor is introduced to the analysis, then an
obvious change in the newspaper's' emphasis on Mao Zedong's
pragmatic and radical quotes would surface. The newspaper's
handling of Mao Zedong's quotes would be dealt with in greater
detail in a separate section.
Besides variation in frequencies among the categories,
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the frequencies of references to Hua Guofeng also fluctuated along
the time dimension. The 3,750 references to Hua Guofeng were
not distributed evenly over the three-year period under study.
On the contrary, the fluctuations were rather great and obvious.
The most obvious fluctuation was the low frequency of references
to Hua Guofeng before he became Party'chairman and the high
frequency of references to, him after his proclamation as
Party chairman. Figure 2 shows the average daily references 13 to
Hua Guofeng during the three-year period studied.
The graph shows that from January 1976 to September 1976,
that is, before the arrest of the Gang of Four, the newspapers
gave little coverage to Hua Guofeng. The highest average daily
reference to Hua Guofeng during that period (9 reference's per
day) was in April, which was the month in which the Tien An Men
Incident broke out and Hua,Guofeng was appointed Premier of the
State Council and the First Vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party. The lowest daily reference to Hua Guofeng in that period
was found in February and March, 1976. Actually, there was not a
single reference to to Hua Guofeng in the sampled newspapers for
these tow months. The low references to Hua Guofeng during this
period testified to the assertion that even after Hua Guofeng's
appointment as acting premier in February 1976, he was still
not portrayed as a prominent political figure by the newspapers.
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While the average daily references to Hua Guofeng was low
before the arrest of the Gang of Four, it surged to an all-
time high after the arrest, especially immediately after the
arrest. As can be seen from the graph in figure 2, in
September 1976, the average daily reference to Hua Guofeng
was only seven, but in October 1976, it surged to 53 and
then to 81 in November 1976. That the highest average daily
references to Hua Guofeng should be found in November instead
of October 1976 is not difficult to comprehend. Though the
Gang of Four were arrested on October 6, 1976, news of their
arrest was not announced in the newspapers until October 22, 1976:
And during the transition period when the Gang of Four were
arrested but the news of the arrest was not yet released,
references to Hua Guofeng increased sharply, but not to the
highest level as after the newspapers officially announced the
arrest of the Gang of Four and the appointment of Hua Guofeng
as the Party chairman. Therefore, the highest frequency of
daily reference to Hua Guofeng (8`1 references per day) appeared
in November instead of October 1976.
Another trend that can be seen from the graph in Figure 2 is
the gradual decline in the average daily references to Hua Guofeng
over the three-year period. Though there were constant fluctuations
in the average daily references to Hua Guofeng over the period,
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the overall trend of gradual decline in the daily average is
still obvious.
Most of the ups and downs in the graph in Figure 2 were
rather situational and were logical consequencies of major
events occured in the country, some of which would surface
when presenting the frequencies of each of the indicators of
legitimacy later in this chapter. But then the overall trend of
gradual decline in reference to Hua Guofeng over the entire
period may not be situational. Such a steady decline over the
three-year period can be more logically explained on the ground
of gradual changes in China's propaganda policy, or a gradual
shift in the country's propaganda objective. For example, with
China's increasing emphasis on the Four Modernizations, the
propagande objective might also shift to that of promting the
Four Xodernizations. As Doak 3arnett has observed: :Today, the
outcome of the first round in China's post-Mao succession points
faiely to a swing...towards greater gragmatism which could result
in a very significant changes in Chinese policies both at home
and aboroad."14
Now let as look at the associations between Hua Guofeng and
the indicators for the four sources of legitimacy, namel,
ideolpgical source, personal source,structural source, and Mao
Zedopng as a source of legitimacy. Figure 3 shows the averace daily
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associations of Hua Guofeng with indicators of ideological,
personal, and structural sources of legitimacy. for the sake
of clarity of presentation, Mao Zedong as a source of legitimacy
is drawn on a separate graph and would be discussed later.
As can be seen from the graphs in Figure 3, structural
legitimacy was emphasized most strongly among the three.
Actually, before the arrest of the Gang of Four, references
to Hua Guofeng were almost entirely associated with symbols of
structural legitimacy. There was virtually no significant
association between Hua Guofe ng and symbols of ideological
and personal legitimacy during that period. When immediately
after the arrest of the Gang of Four, Hua's association with
symbols of all these three types of legitimacy increased, but
the greatest increase was founts in his associations with symbols
of Struc tural legitimacy. Hua Guofens's associations with symbols
of structural legitimacy account for 1,815(48.4 %) of the total
references to Hua.
While Hua Guofeng's asscciations with symbols of structural
legitimacy was emphasized most strongly,his associations with
symbols of ideological legitimacy, on the other hand, was the
most stable among, the three. Hua Guofeng's associations with symbols
of structural and personal legitimacy fluctuate widely,at times
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they surged to a very high level, and at other times, they droped
to a very low level. The magnitude of fluctuations were very great.
But then for ideological legitimacy, the magnitude of fluctuations
was the smallest, as can be seen from the graphs. Hua Guofeng's
associations with symbols of ideological legitimacy account for
844 (22.5 %) of the total references to Hua.
Hua 6uo f eng' s associations with symbols of personal legitimacy
come the third, they account for 555 (14.8 36) of the total
references to Hua. As can be seen from Figure 3, Hua su:ofeng's
associations with symbols of personal legitimacy increased only
slightly in October, 1976, the month in which he was proclaimed
Party chairman. But the associations surged to a maximum in the
following, month with a daily average of 19 references in this
category in one issue of ne%:s-caoer. And after that it started
to drop.
Hua Guofeng' s associations with Mao Medong as a source of
legitimacy received the least emohasis among the four fources.
They account for 360(9.6 %) of the total raferences to Hua.
This association was not shown in Figure 3, but it will be dealt
with later.
Now let us look at Hua Guofeng's associations with andicators
of each of these four sources of legitimecy in grrater detain
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Ideological Legitimacy_
Ideological legitimacy here comprises of two indicators,
namely, symbols of pragmatic politics and symbols of radical
politics. These two indicators represent the ideological
sources of legitimacy in our analytical scheme because both
of them represent the ideological committment of the new leader-
ship.
For the total 344 as:ociatio ns between Hua Guofeng and
symbols of ideological legitimacy, 91% was attributable to
riua's associations with symbols of radical olitI.cs, and only
9 % was at tributable to Hua's associations with symbols of
radical politics. The emphasis on politics is evident
from the graphs in Figure 4, which shows Hua ofeng's associations
with symbols of pragmatic and radical politics per sampled issue
in each month.
The high association between Hua Guofeng ans symbols of
pragmatic politics can be understood in light of two factors.
First, after the purge of the Fang of Four, China was shifting
to a more prigmatic policy. And achieve the Four Modernizations
had even been listed in the new Constitution of the PRC as H
"general task for the people of the whole country." 15 And Hua
huofeng, as the head of the party and state, would naturally
be portrayed as thking a leading role pushing forward the
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The second factor might be that the nation wishes to unite
the people and legitimize the new leader by pushing forward a
more pragmatic policy that would promise improved living
standards for the people. This is in line with some contemporary
political scientists' contention that in industrial societies,
legitimacy is established through the provision of material
compensation. In Friedrich Carl's words, The ruler who improves
th standard of living will be considered legitimate. 16 But
we have no proof from this study that the Chinese media leaders
actually had this intention in mind in their attempts to
legitimize Hua Guofeng.
Another aspect that deserves attention in Hua Guofeng's
associations with symbols of ideological legitimaey is that
the associatons increased more gradually. Unlike Hua's
associations with symbols of structural and personal legitimacy
Which increased sharply and sudderly in October and November 1976,
Hua's associations with symbols of ideological legltimacy gained
momentum more gratually and had not strengthened significantly
until Sanuary 1977.
Personal Legitimacy
Personal legitimacy in this study comprises of two indicators.
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One is Hua Guofeng's associations with themes showing FIua's
concern for the people and the people's admiration of Hua.
The other are themes concerning Hua's personal qualities. Both
of them are related to Hua Guofeng as an unique individual with
special qualities and characters. In these two indicators,
Hua Guofeng's associations with the Chinese people were
emphasized more than his associations with themes concerning
his personal qualities.
Figure 5 shows she daily average associations between Hua
Guofeng and indicators of personal legi ti Tracy for each month
during the study period. or the total 558 references to iua
Guofeng in this category, 66 were attributable to Hua's
associations with the Chinese people, while the rest 34 % were
attributable to Hua's associations with themes concerning his
personal qualities.
The relative high associations between Hua Cuofeng and the
Chinese people is not difficult to comprehend. China, with a
17
population of about 900 million has always stressed the
importance and value of peeple. Any after Hua Guofeng became
the party chairman, there were many artioles and news stories
stressing Hua duofeng's concern for the people's
respect and admiration for the now chairman. For example, a
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and snow to travel on foot to visit a school in Beijing...
and talk with (the students) with heart warming kindness.18
More common examples were the numerious stories telling how
Hua Guofeng cared and concerned for the people during his
visits to Tangshan after the earthquake. For example, the whole-
page story entitled Chairman Hua and people's hearts join
together 19 in Renmin Ribao contained many references to Hua
of this nature.
rind, as a matter of fact, the very first official announce-
ment of the appointment of Hua Guofeng as Party chairman in
the October 22, 1976 issue of Renmin Ribao was headlined
the People celebrated the appointment of comrade qua G uofeng
as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.
(emphasis added). Also, afterall, it was the people who
were the target of the campaign to legitimize the new chairman.
she other indicators of persoanl legitimacy in this study
were themes concerning Hua Guofeng's personal qualities. For
example, the reference to Hua uofeng that Chairman Hua
never yields on important questions of priaciple. References
like this were rather obvious attempts on the part of the media
leaders to leigitimize and popularize Hua Guofeng. On the other
hand, in the 159 issues of newspicers saripled, no article shed
Tight on Hua Guofeng's personal background. There was no
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mentioning on whether Hua Guofeng is married, how many children he
has or even how old he is. This is quite a contrast with,
say, Britain, in which when Mrs. M. Thatcher was elected prime
Minister, the newspapers gave rather detailed reports on her
family and family members.
As can be seen from the graphs in Figure 5, besides the
greater emphasis on Hua's associations with the Chinese people,
another major difference between the two graphs was that Hua
Guofeng's associations with people reached a maximum earlier,
in November 1970, while Hua's associations with themes concerning
his personal qualities did not reach a maximum until January 1977.
But then besides these two differences, the two graphs are rather
similar in their trends. Both of them decrease graudally after
reaching the maximum.
The gradual decrease in Hua Guofeng's associations with
indicators of personal legitimacy can partly be understood in
light of China's repeated call for the prevention of individual-
cult towards the end of 1978. for example, Ting Wang observed
that After the fall of the Gang of Four, the Chinese Media
had once attempted to build up Hua Guofeng's personal cult,
but this move ran counter to the wish of the majority of senior
cadres and Party members. 22 The call for the prevention of
personal cult gather greater momentum towards the end of 1978.
And later, in March 11, 1979, a special commentator of the
Guangming Ribao went so far as to state explicitly that The
prevention of personal cult is a major principle we have to
observe in our propagnada policy. 23 IN view of this, it is
not difficult to comprehend the decline in Hua Guofeng's
associations with symbols of personal legitimacy towards the
end of 1978.
Structural Legitimacy
structural legitimacy was emphasized most strongly among the
four. Actually, before the arrest of the Gang of Hour, references
to Hua uuofeng were almost entirely associated with indicators
of structural legitimacy.
As has been noted in Chapter 2, structural legitimacy has
special bearing in the case of Hua Guofeng. Because for ideological
and personal source of legitimacy a certain period of time is
need to inculcate the sense of legitimacy in the members. But
for structural legitimacy, the legitimizing effect is more
immediate. The legitimizin effect of structural sauces of
legitimacy is more immediate in the sense that the de facto leader
would to a certain extent be reeearded as the legitimate leader
no matter how familiar or unfamiliar the lender was prior to
his erner ence. And in view of the abructness of the
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arrest of the Gang of Four and the proclamation of Hua Guofeng
as the Party chairman, the new leaderhisp needed to establish
their legitimacy immediately. And since the legitimizing effect
of structural sources is more immediate, therefore it can be
expected that immediately after the arrest of the Gang of Four,
symbols of structural legitimacy were associated with Hua Guofeng
most frequently. But the findings do not prove that the Chinese
media leader actually had this in mind in their attempts to
legitimize Hua Guofeng.
Structural legitimacy in this study comprises of two indicators.
And for the 1,815 references to Hua Guofeng under this category,
80.1 % were attributable to Hua Guofeng's associations with
Party and state head activities, and the rest 19.9 % were
attributable to Hua Guofeng's associations with the Gang of
Four. Figure 6 shows the daily average associations between
Hua uuofeng the the indicators of structural legitimacy.
As can be seen from the graph, Hua Guofeng's associations
with Party and state head activities fluctuated rather widely.
some of these fluctuations were consequencies of major events
occured in China. ior example the rise in July 1977 probably
was partly :iue to the f-act that the Chinese Communist Party
held its Third Plenary Session from July 16 to 21. And actually
it was in that meeting that Hua Cuofeng's appointment ss
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and
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its Military Commission was confirmed, and in that meeting, Hua
Guofeng made an important speech in his capacity as the Party
chairman. It was also in that meeting that Deng Xiaoping was
restored to his previous posts. Under such a political atmosphere,
it was natural that references to Hua Guofeng, and probably
to other senior leaders as well, would be on the increase.
Similarly, the rise in March 1978 was probably partly due
to the holding of the First Session of the Fifth National
People's congress in which Hua Guofeng's position as the Premier
of the State Council was confirmed. Also,the two rises in
May and August 1978 were accompanied by Hua Guofeng's visits to
North Korea and Yugoslavia, respectively. The newspapers
gave very detailed reports on the two visits, hence the higher
associations between Hua Guofeng and Party and state head
activities in these months.
while Hua juofeng's associations with Party and state head
activities still surged high occasionally in late 1978 due to
various major domestic events, his associations with the Gang
of Four had not risen to any particuI high level after the
peak in November 1976, which was the month after the arrest of the
Gang of Four. The graph shows that during the two-year period
from January 1977 to the end of 1978, the highest daily associations
between Hua Guofeng and the Clang of Four was just around 5. This
59
difference in emphasis between Hua Guofeng's associations with
the two indicators of legitimacy shows that towards 1977 and
especially 1978, while Hua Guofeng was still portrayed as the
Party and state head performing Party and state head activities,
his role in saving.the Party and the country by smashing the
Gang of Four was emphasized less and less frequently.
Mao Zedong as a Source of Legitimacy
As has been noted, Mao Zedong was still a symbol of authority
and legitimacy shortly after his death, or at least he was so
regaraed by the Chinese media leaders shortly after his death. Thus
the newspapers had associated Hua Guofeng with Mao Zedong in
order to build up Hua's legitimacy
Figure 7 shows the average daily associations of Hua Guofeng
with Mao Zedong for each month in the three-year period. The one
distinctive feature of the graph is the sharp increase in the
associations from, less than 1 association per day in September
1976 to 12 associations per day in October 1976. Then in
November 1976, one month after Hua's proclamation as Party chair-
min, the graph reached a maximum o f 15.2 associations per day.
The high associations between Hua Gaofeng and Mao Zedong
in the newspapers immediately after proclamation as the
Party chairman might suggest that the media leaders were well
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FIGURE 7 -- AVERAGE DAILY ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN HUA GUOFENG AND MAO ZHEDONG













aware of the importance of Mao Zedong as a symbol of legitimacy
even after his death, hence they repeatedly use this to
legitimize Hua Guofen.
similar observations have been reported in other studies.
For example. Peter Nan-shong Lee observed that Even after
the death of Chairman Mao, the initial success of Hua Guofeng
can be explained in terms of his image-building as a true
disciple of Chairman Mao. 24 And The ritualism surrounding
the construction of Chairman Mao's memorial hall and
publication of volute five of Mao Zedong's selected-works
undercored the symbolic importance of Mao Zedong in the post-
Mao period.25
Also, Hua Guofeng's association. with Mao Zedong is the
least persistant in comparision with Hua's associations with
other symbols of legitimacy. in October 1977, one year after
his proclamation as Party chairman, Hua Juofeng's associations
with Mao Zedong had already droped to less than 1 association
per day. And after this drop, it had not climbed up to any
significant level. furthermore, starting from rune 1973, no
further association between Hua Ouofeng and Mao Zedong was
found in the sampled newspaper issues. But, as can be seen from
the graphs in Figure 3, Hua Guofeng's associations with
other symbols of legitimacy had not registered such a sudden
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drop in as early as October 1977, and that they had not died
down so completely towards the end of 1978.
One cause for the drop in Hua Guofeng's associations with
Mao Zedong was probably due to the new leadership's decision
not to deify Mao Zedong. As a result, less emphasis was
accorded to the symbolic importance of i'lao Zedong as a source
of legitimacy.
Mao Zedong's Quotes
As has already been mentioned, Liao Zedong was still a symbol
of authority and legitimacy after his death, at least shortly
after his death. So there is reason to assume that Hua aofeng's
supporters would .make use of Mao Zedong's quotes to justify
their cause. In Peter Nan-shong Lee's words, It was inevitable
that (the radical leaders and pragmatic leaders) would use Mao's
words in order to construct a case against each other.26 There-
fore, the study of Mao's quotes in the newspapers would shed
light on how the media leaders utilize Mao Zedono's sayings to
justify the new leadership's course.
In the 159 issues of newspapers analyzed, there were a total
of 1,499 direct quotations from Mao Zedong. Among them, Kao
Zedong's pragmatic quotes occured most frequently, they account
for 37.5% of the total references. Some of the typical quotes
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that are pragmatic in nature include Unite together and build
China into a strong Socialist state In agriculture, learn
from Dazhai in industry, learn from aging The great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution has continued for eight
years, now it is better to have stability, etc.
Mao Zedong's radical quotes, on the other hand, include
such statements like The capitalist-roaders are still on the
capitalist road Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution till the end Class struggle is the key link
Never forget class and class struggle;" Revolutions and
revolutionary wars are inevitable in class society;"Political
work is the life-blood of all economic works. etc.
Besides pragmatic quotes and radical quotes, some quotations
of iao Zedong are neither pragmatic ncr radical. These include
quotations like The people, and the people alone, are the
motive force in the making of world history;"Without a people's
army the people have nothing and Al our literature and art
are for the masses of the people, etc. These kinds of Quotes
are usually not central to the struggle between the pragmatic
and the rndical line of politics, so they were not further
studied in this paper.
Figure 8 shows the average daily ouotations of Mao Zedcng's
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FIGURE 8 AVERAGE DAILY REFERENCES TO MAO ZHEDONG'S QUOTES
FOR EACH MONTH DURING THE PERIOD STUDIED

















inatructions for each month during the three-year study period.
One noted feature is the gradual and steady decline in the
references to Mao Zedong's quotes in the newspapers. The only
major break in the declining trend was the peak in October 1976,
which was the month in which the Gang of Four were arrested.
Two reasons are offered here to account for the high
frequency of Mao Zedong's quotes in October 1976. The first
one is that in early October 1976 before the arrest of the Gang
of Four, Mao Zedong's directives were widely quoted in the news-
papers to justify the radical line. One of the most widely
quoted directives were Act according to the principles laid down.
This directive, as we know, was later alleged by the new leaders
as a forged Mao Zedong directive signaling the Four's attempted
coup. We have no proof as to whether the quote was a forged one
or not, but occurence of this quote did increase sharply in early
October 1976 before the arrest of the yang of Your.
The second factor contributed to the high frequency of Mao
edong's quotes in October 1976 was due to the high e ployment
of Mao's quotes by the new leadership during the transition
period. As has beer: noted, after the rest of the Gang of Four
on October 6, 1j76, the news was not announced in the newspaper:
until October 22, 1976. And during that period, Mao Zedong's
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sayings were widely quoted in the newspapers, but this time not
to justify the radical line, but in line with the new leadership
as well as in preparation for the announcement of the big news.
The most widely quoted Mao's sayings during that period were
the famous Three do's and three don'ts" "Practise jla rxism, and
not revisionism unite and don't split be open and aboveboard,
and don't intrigue and conspire."And later, "Nith you in charge,
I am at ease."
And after Mao Zedong's quotes in the newspapers reached a
maximum in October 1976, it started to decline, especially in l:te
1978 when the drop was more marked. 2hi s probably has something
to do with China's call for the cdemythification of Mao Zedong
towards late 1978. For example, in September 22, 1978, a Renmin
Ribao special commentator wrote: "Mao Cedong thought should be
taked down from the sacred alter which was used for fooling the
people." 27 And in fact, as early as Karch 1977, the question
of the possibility of "De-maoization" in post-Kao China had
already been raised by a western scholar. 28
Besides the decline in the newspapers' employment of Mao'
quotes, there was other evidence suggesting the decresing
importance accorded Mao gedong by the newspapers towards 1978.
One such evidence was the occassional, and, later, complete
cancelation of "Quotaion from Chairman Mao" at the top right
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hand corners next to the mastheads of Renmin Ribao and.iangming
Ribao.
Since the Cultural Revolution, the top right hand corners
next to the mastheads of these newspapers had been specially
reserved for selected quotations of Mao Zedong, or, occasionally,
of Marx and Stalin. But on January 15, 1977, Renmin Ribao printed
a quotation from Hua Guofeng instead of from Mao Zedong at that
special box next to the masthead. After this, the quotation
from Chairman Mao next to the masthead began to appear less and
less frequently. And towards the end of 1978, Mao Zedong's quotes
no longer appeard in that corner. Instead, the space was used
to report some national news, mostly on development and
modernizations.
In addition, towards the end of 1973, Mao Zedong' s quites
in the texts were no longer printed in boldface type. This,
together with the decreasing frequency in the newspaper's
reference to Lao Zedong quotes and the cancelation of quotation
from Chairman Mao next to the mastheads of the newspapers, all
seem to suggest that the symbolic importance of Mao Zedeng in
post-Mao China is declining.
But while there was evidence suggesting the declining
symbolic importance of Mao Zedong in post-Mao China, Mao Zedong's
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quotes have not completely disappeared from the newspapers. They
only showed a gradual decrease and then maintained at a minimal
level. But then within this decreasing number of Mao Zedong's
quotes in the newspapers, there was also a change in the nature
of the quotes appeared in the newspapers. As the founder of the
Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China, Mao
Zedong had said and written lots of things during his lifetime.
Under different situations and circumstances his sayings would
at time appear self-conflicting nad contradicting when taken
out of context. So it is not surprising to find that some of
Mao's sayings are more pragmatic and some more radical in nature.
Figure 9 shows the average daily occurence of Mao Zedong's
pragmatic and radical quotes for each month in the two newspapers
over the three-year period.
The graph shows a sudden change in the emphasis accord Mao
Zedong's pra matic quotes an radical quotes over the period
with October 1976 as the point of inflection. More specifically,
before the arrest of the Gang of Foar and the proclamation of
Hua Guofeng as Party chairman, the newspapers' emphasis was placed
on Nao Zedong's radical quotes. But after that, the emphasis
was on Mao Zedong's pragmatic quotes. As can be seen from Figurere 9,
the two lincs intersect at October 1976, and the shift in emphasis
was obvious. Table 3 shows the frequencies of occurence of Mao
Zedong's pragmatic and radical quctes in Renmin Ribao and
FIGURE 9 AVERAGE DAILY REFERENCES TO MAO ZHEDONG'S AND RADICAL QUOTES





















Guangming Ribao before and after the arrest of the Gang of Four.
TABLE 3
OCCURICE OF MAO ZHEDONG'S PRAGMATIC AND RADICAL QUOTES
IN RENMIN RIBAO AND GUANGMING RIBAO









Using chi-sauare test, the difference is found to be significant
at .001 level. This is in line with Doak Barnett's contention that
in Post-Mao China, the over all trend of policy will be toward
long-term economic policies....Such trends, if they occure, will
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probably be justified by citing Maoist doctrin, suitably adapted
or manipulated.29
Besides Mao Zhedong's pragmatic and radical quotes, there were
also 30 % of Mao's quotes that were neither pragmatic nor radical.
Usually this kind of quotes have little to do-with the struggle
between the pragmatic line and the radical line. For example,
Mao Zhedong's saying that The people, and the people alone, are
the motive force in the making of world history. Or the quotes may
take a rather neutral stand, for example, the quote Grasp revolution
and promote productuon emphasizes both revolution and production,
hence, for this study, it was classified as neutral. These kinds
of quotes that are neither pragmatic nor radical did not show any
marked trend during the three-year period under study. Probably
they were used by both the radical and the pragmatic leaders.
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This study finds that during the three-year period from
January 1, 1976, to December 31, 1978, Hua Guofeng was mentioned
on the average of 23.6 times in each of the 159 issues of news-
papers sampled for analysis. And in these 23.6 daily references,
11.4 references were associated with themes which, according to
Easton's theory, would enhance the structural legitimacy of Hua
Guofeng 5.3 references would enhance the ideological legitimacy
of Hua Guofeng 3.5 references would enhance the personal
legitimacy of Hua Guofeng. Another 2.3 references to ua
Guofeng had associated him with MLao Zedong. And the rest 1.1
references could not be fit into the analytical scheme adcDted
in this study.
The study also finds that Pao Zedong's sayings were
cauoted on the average of 9.4 times in each issue of newspapr.
For these 9.4 daily references to Mao Zebong's quotes,3.3 quotes
were pragmatic in nature 3.1 quotes were radical in nature, and
the rest 2.8 quotes were neither Drag latic nor radical in
nature. And that be ore Hua Guofeng's proclamation as Party
chairman, most ouotes that appeared in the newspapers were radical
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in nature, but after Hua's proclamation, most of the quotes
were pragmatic in nature. The differences was found to be significant
at .001 level.
Thus we can say that for Hua Cuofeng's case, the Chinese
newspapers had placed more emphasis on the structural legitimacy
of the new leadership, ideological legitimacy came second,
personal legitimacy came third, and Mao Zedong as a source of
legitimacy received the least attention.
Also, the new leadership had emphasized more on Mao Zedong's
sayings that are in line with a more pragmatic policy which,
at the writing of this paper, the new leadership was oashi ng
forward.
However there are some weaknesses in the design of this
study as well as some limitations on the scope of the stu?y
which preclude us from making definite conclusion concerning
the legitimization of leaders in China.
For one thing, the study had covered the legitiminntion
of Hua duofeng only. And as such the scope of the study is
too narrow for us to make inference concerning the legitimzation
of Chinese leaders in general. For example, in Hua Guofung' s
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case, this study shows that the newspapers emphasized most
strongly the structural legitimacy. but this might or might
not be the case in the legitimization of other Chinese
leaders. Take Mao Zedong as an example, in the legitimization
of Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution, the newspapers
might have emphasized more on the personal legitimacy of
Moa Zedong in order to build up his personal cult. While for
the legitimization of Deng Xiaoping after he was restored to
all his posts in 1977, the press might have emphasized more
on ideological legitimacy because Deng Xiaoping is a strong
advocaat of the pragmatic politics which the new leadership
is pushing forward. Or it might turn out that in all cases,
the media place more emphasis on structural legitimacy. Now,
this study only shows that for the legitimization of Hua Cuofeng,
the press had emphasized more on structural legitimacy, but
we don't know whether this is a rule practised by the Chinese
media. leaders irrespective of the leaders they attempt to
legitimize or whether this emphasis on structural legitimacy
was unique to Hua Guofeng's case.
Having recognized this inadeauicy, one sugrestion offer
here is to continue pursue along this line using similar
analytical framework to study the Chinese newspaer's coverage
on other leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping,
and menbers of the Gang of Four before their fall. Findings
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from a series of case studies like these would then enable us
to draw inferences concerning the Chinese media leaders'
formula of image building and legitimization of their leaders.
Or at least we can see whether the differences in emphasis
placed on structural legitimacy, ideological legitimacy, and
personal legitimacy are due to individual differences among
the leaders or not. Or whether there exists any difference in
the newspapers' coverage on these leaders in terms of the emphasis
placed on each of these aspects of legitimacy.
The same can be done to the newspapers and leaders in
other countries. For example, we can use a similar analytical
framework to study the British newspapers' coverage of their
new prime minister, or the U.S. newspapers' coverage on a
newly-elected president. Findings from these studies would
then enable us to do some cross-cultural and cross-national
commarisions.
Another weakness in the design of the study is that in the
analysis of Mao Zedong's quotes, instead of analysing Mao's
quotes that were associated with Hua Guofeng, all Mao Zedong's
quotes that appeared in the newspapers were analyzed indiscriminately,
Thus, we don't know whether the pragmatic quotes were associated
with Hua Guofeng or with the Gang of Four and similarly, we
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don't know whether the radical quotes were associated with
Hua Guofeng or the Gang of Four. This inevitably reduces the
interpretative power of the findings. The findings would be more
revealing if Mao Zedong's quotes had been further differentiated
according to whether the quotes were associated with Mao Zedong
or with the Gang of Four.
Another limitation of this study is that the findings do not
give us any information on the effect of the Chinese media
leaders' campaign in legitimizing the new chairman. The study
has made systematic observations on the part of the communication
act- and messages of the communicators only, but we know
nothing about the audience-and the effect of these communication
acts on the Chinese people. To know both sides of the story,
the study should ideally be supplemented by an audience survey.
Unfortunately, the possibility of doing this is still rather
remote.
Perhaps one generalization we can draw at this stage is
that the leadership circle of the People's Republic of China
is highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts
to affect it --as has been observed by Ithiel de Sola Pool,1
The high frequencies of references to Hua Guofeng immediately
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after his proclamation as Party chairman coupled with the
newspaper's shifted emphasis on the use of Mao Zedong's sayings
all suggested a conscious effort on the part of the Chinese
media leaders to legitimize Hua Guofeng. And in so far as
the propaganda machinery is under direct Party control, we can
say that the Party is highly conscious of public opinion.
The Chinese Communist Party does not rule by sheer force. On
the contrary, the leadership circle has done quite a lot to
incalcate a sense of legitimacy in the members in order to
gain popular support. And in doing this, the mass media have
played a very important position, just as Lucian Pye's observation
that the-media have a major role in the maintenance of the
legitimacy of the system.2
Another observation we can state at this stage is that
in China, with the media of communication under Party control,
the dominant political group and the mass media are closely inter-
mingled. When the Gang of Four were in power, they were able to
utilize the mass media to their factional interest, but after
they were purged, the new leadership then used the mass media
to denounce them. In both cases, the leadership circles were
able to mobilize the mass media to create a public sentiment in
the line with the prevaling politics-and to prevent the political
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enemy to have access to the mass media. Just as Chairman Mao
had said:
In an era in which classes and class struggle
still exist both at home and abroad, the
working class and the masses who have seized
state power must suppress the resistance
to the revolution put up by all counter-
revolutionary classes, groupp and individuals,
thwart their activities aimed at restoration
and prohibit them from exploiting freedom
of speech for counter-revolutionary purposes.3
'Ind this statement has indeed pointed out the basic essence
of the relation between Politics and the media of communication
and. expression in China.
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APPENDIX A : A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR DOMESTIC EVENTS IN CHINA
FROM JANUARY 1976 TO DECEMBER 1978
1976 Jan. 8 Premier Zhou 'lnlai died
Feb. 7 Hua Guofeng appointed acting premier
April 5 Tien An Men Incident
April 7 Hua Guofeng appointed First Vice-chairman
of the CCP Central Committee and Premier
of the State Council
Deng Xiaoping dismissed of all posts
Sept. 9 Mao Zhedong died
Oct. 6 Gang of Four arrested
Oct. 22 The arrest of the Gang of Four and the
appointment of qua Guofeng as Chairman
of the CCP Central Committee and its
military Commission officially announced
1977 July 21 The 3rd Plenary Session of the 10th
Central Committee of the CCP held.
The Session rectified the appointment
of Hua Guofeng to his posts
The Session restored Deng Xiaoping
to all his former Posts
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APPENDIX A (contd)
1977 Aug. 12- 11th National Congress of
Aug. 18 the CCP held. A new Constitution
of the CCP was adopted
1978 Feb. 26- First Session of the 5th National
March 5 People's Congress held. The Congress
rectified the appointment of Hua
luofeng as premier of the State
Council
Nov. 15 Tien An Men Incident officially
declared as a completely revolu-
tionary movement
Dec. Many of the senior cadres purged
during the Cultural Revolution
began to be restored to leading
positions
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APPENDIX B: CODING INSTRUCTIONS AND CODING SHEET
分 析 大 綱
總 論
( 一 ) 每 次 分 析 一 份 報 紙 時 , 用 一 張 新 的 分 析 紙
<couing slceet>
< 二 > 除 了 純 外 國 新 聞 之 外 , 每 份 報 紙 所 以 內 容
都 要 分 析 , 包 括 詩 歌 , 話 劇 , 散 文 等 ;
< 三 > 由 每 份 報 紙 第 一 版 開 始 分 析 , 到 第 二 版 , 第 三
版 , 按 序 分 析 . 如 果 第 一 版 的 文 章 未 完 , 繼 續
刊 在 另 外 一 版 , 那 便 跳 到 該 版 , 分 析 完 整 篇
文 章 , 然 後 轉 回 第 一 版 , 繼 續 分 析 其 之 文 章 ,
< 四 > 分 析 方 法 : 一 片 文 章 中 每 次 提 及 华 国 鋒 ( 或 华
主 席 > 的 时 候 , 便 分 析 该 次 提 及 华 国 鋒 時
的 主 旨 是 什 麽 < 或 分 析 報 紙 上 华 国 鋒 的 名 字
用 什 麽 主 旨 連 在 一 起 > ,
注 意 : 不 是 分 析 每 篇 文 章 的 主 旨 , 而 是 分 析
每 次 報 上 提 及 华 国 鋒 名 字 時 的 主 旨
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每 逢 华 国 鋒 的 名 字 出 現 一 次 , 便 把 該 次 出 現
的 主 旨 歸 納 在 分 析 表 上 所 到 八 項 主 旨 中 的
一 項 < 不 可 多 遇 或 少 過 一 項 > ; 並 在 適 當 的
項 目 下 填 " / " ; 如 果 一 篇 文 章 中 , 某 項 主 題 共
出現三次,便填"///";七次便填"//// /i",
以 此 類 推 ;
< 五 > 當 文 章 這 中 有 任 何 直 接 引 用 毛 澤 東 所 講 的 話 , 便
("maos Quctes"
其 中 一 項 . 如 果 毛 澤 東 講 話 中 有 提 及 华 国 鋒 的
名 字 , 便 依 然 分 析 華 國 鋒 名 字 的 方 法 , 把 提 及
华 国 鋒 名 字 時 的 主 旨 , 列 在 八 項 主 旨 中 其 中 一 項 ;
< 六 > 為 增 加 工 作 效 率 及 準 確 性 , 分 析 時 , 應 用 一 把 不 透
明 的 尺 , 放 在 報 紙 上 , 然 後 迅 速 閱 覽 報 紙 , 一 面
看 , 一 面 推 動 間 尺 , 一 發 現 有 " 华 国 鋒 " 或 " 毛 主 席 "
导 字 眼 便 停 止 , 然 後 仔 細 看 看 該 次 出 現 時 的
主 旨 是 什 麽 , 便 在 適 當 的 項 目 下 項 " / " , 以 此 類
推 . 眼 睛 應 該 對 < 华 > , < 毛 > 等 字 眼 特 別 敏 感 .
現 在 可 以 正 式 進 行 分 析 . 你 現 在 手 中 的 報 紙
並 沒 有 副 本 , 所 以 请 小 心 报 管 , 切 勿 弄 毁 ; 分
析工作,需在碧秋楼地下 G6 或 G7 工作室進
行 . 分 析 時 需 用 藍 筆 填 寫 . 如 要 改 正 请 用 紅 筆
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:DATE( 日子 )
用 六 位 数 把 报 纸 出 版 的 年 , 月 , 日 寫 出 , 例 如
一九七六年一月一日 便填 " 760101 ";
一九七八年十二月三十一日 便填 " 781231 ".依此類推
第二項: PAPER ( 報紙 )
如果分析的是人民日報, 填 " 1 ";
光明日報, 填 " 2 ";
第三項: PAGE ( 頁 )
在分析某份報紙第一版( 第一頁 )時填 " 1 " ,第二
版時,填 "2" ,依此類推,按序分析,
:STORY NO.( 文章编号 )
每份報紙第一篇分析的文章编号是 " 01 " 第二
篇是 "02" ,依此類推,直到某份報紙分
析 完 為 止 ;
注 意 : 分 析 每 一 份 報 紙 時 , 都 該 由 該 報 第 一
版 在 右 上 角 的 《 毛 主 席 語 錄 》 開 始 ； 故 此
《毛主席語錄》 的文章编號一定是 “C1”
然 後 其 它 文 章 依 序 分 析 。
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第五至十二項（ praqluatic politics to cthers)
每 當 華 國 鋒 ， （ 或 华 副 總 理 ， 华 總 理 ， 华 主 席 ） 出 現 一 次 ，
就 看 看 該 次 是 在 哪 一 個 主 題 下 出 現 ， 或 是 把 华 国 鋒
卤 什 么 主 旨 連 在 一 起 ， 然 後 在 下 列 八 項 的 其 中 一 項
填 “ / ” 。 每 項 主 旨 / 主 題 定 義 如 下 ：
Andpragmatic pelitics ( 實踐派的政治路线 ）
包 括 - 四 個 現 代 化
其 它 各 方 面 的 現 代 化
有 關 科 技 發 展 ， 社 會 建 設 的 事 情
工 ， 农 業 方 面 的 發 展
學 習 大 寒 ， 大 慶 ， 提 高 生 產
鼓 吹 自 由 民 主 ， 百 花 齊 放 等
促 進 团 结 ， 促 進 安 定 ， 不 要 搞 分 裂 等
保 障 公 民 权 （ 權 ） ， 保 衛 社 会 主 義 法 权 等
改善人民生活水平
提 高 教 育 水 平 ， 提 倡 智 育
搞好經濟
搞 好 與 外 國 之 外 交 關 係 及 經 濟 關 係
文 艺 鼓 吹 文 化 ， 百 花 齊 放 等 路 线
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B. RADICAL poUTICS （激进派政治路线）
包 括 把 無 產 階 級 文 化 大 革 命 進 行 到 底
繼 續 階 級 鬥 爭 ， 把 階 級 鬥 爭 進 行 到 底
繼 續 革 命 ， 把 無 產 階 級 革 命 進 行 到 底
走 資 派 仍 在 走 , 党 内 足 資 派 仍 在 走
打 倒 一 切 資 本 家 主 義 路 線 的 人
打 倒 修 正 主 義 等
打 倒 祥 如 哲 學 等
鼓 吹 無 產 階 級 專 政
繼 續 深 入 批 孔 ， 批 鄧
繼 續 深 入 批 判 右 傾 翻 案 風
C.chiuese peeple ( 人民，廣大群家，廣大之工，农，兵 ）
包 括 ：
华 主 席 關 懷 人 民 ， 体 恤 人 民 生 活
华 国 鋒 和 人 民 心 連 心
华 国 鋒 是 人 民 的 好 領 袖 ， 好 主 席 等
华 国 鋒 訪 問 ， 体 察 某 地 人 民 人 生 ， 工 作 等
人 民 對 华 国 鋒 無 限 敬 愛 等
华 国 鋒 表 達 了 億 万 人 民 的 心 願
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D.party o stale Head ( 党，军，国领导人之括动 ）
包 括 - 华 国 锋 接 见 外 賓 ， 卤 外 賓 會 談 ，
以 領 導 人 身 份 開 會
华 国 鋒 作 重 要 誤 話 ， 發 出 適 告 定
华 国 鋒 次 領 導 人 身 份 作 某 某 決 定
次 領 導 人 身 份 參 觀 民 訪 問 国 內 国 外
次 領 導 人 身 份 指 揮 事 情 ， 行 動
次 領 導 人 身 份 出 席 各 種 會 議
注 意
習 慣 性 的 稱 呼 ， 如 “ 华 国 鋒 同 志 為 首 的 黨 中 央
這 裡 ， 雖 然 說 是 以 华 国 鋒 同 志 【 為 首 】 ， 但 這 個 只 是
習 慣 性 的 稱 呼 ， 故 此 不 應 歸 於 此 項 ， 應 弄 清 楚
這 次 出 現 的 主 旨 ， 然 後 才 決 定 應 歸 於 那 一 項 。
E Gang of Four or ulembers （四人幫式四人幫之份子）
" 四 人 幫 " 這 個 名 詞 ， 是 在 正 式 公 佈 王 洪 文 ， 張 春 橋 ，
姚文元及江清被抓 ( 761021
出 現 。 在 此 之 前 ， 報 紙 上 將 华 国 鋒 和 四 人 幫 中 任 何
一 份 子 一 起 提 及 時 ， 兩 者 的 關 係 總 是 正 面 或 中 性
的 。 例 如
“ 張 春 橋 和 華 國 鋒 兩 個 同 志
就 某 項 問 題 作 深 入 討 論 ” 等
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而 當 四 人 幫 被 抓 之 后 ， 當 华 国 鋒 的 名 字 和 四 人 幫 （ 或 其
干 一 份 子 ） 連 起 時 ， 兩 者 的 關 係 是 反 面 的 . 例 如 ：
" 华 国 鋒 同 志 為 首 的 党 中 央 ， 一 舉
粉 碎 了 四 人 幫 党 奪 權 的 陰 謀 " 。
所 以 ， 不 時 向 上 的 區 別 ，
兩 者 兩 連 時 的 性 質 ： 不 必 再 分 析 這 個 相 連 是 正 面
或 反 面 ， 只 需 知 道 兩 者 相 連 出 現 的 次 數 便 可 。 這 項
目包括
华 国 鋒 同 志 為 首 的 黨 中 央 ， 一 舉 粉 碎 了
四 人 幫 的 陰 謀 ， 挽 救 了 黨
在 四 人 幫 控 制 下 ， 興 論 工 具 把 華 國 鋒 的
形象縮小了
四 人 幫 的 詭 計 超 不 過 革 明 的 華 國 鋒 等
在 某 某 大 會 上 ， 華 國 鋒 同 志 和 四 人 幫 進 行
了尖銳門爭
（ 注 意 ： 在 這 裡 ， 華 國 鋒 名 字 的 出 現 ， 主 旨 是
在 報 導 他 和 四 人 幫 作 鬥 爭 ， 而 不 是 報 導 他 以
領 導 人 身 份 參 加 某 某 大 會 ， 所 以 應 歸 於
Gand of Four or mtwbers ' 這一項，而不是
"partyf stste Hecui" 那一項。
此 原 則 在 其 之 類 似 事 故 一 樣 適 用
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F. Personal Qualities : （ 個 人 品 格 、 才 幹 ）
當 提 及 華 國 鋒 時 ， 如 果 其 主 題 或 者 □ 點 是 在
讚 美 或 描 述 華 國 鋒 的 個 人 品 格 氣 質 或 才
幹 等 ， 便 應 歸 於 此 項 ， 典 型 的 例 子 如 ：
華 主 席 是 無 產 階 級 革 命 路 線 的 卓
越 繼 承 者
華 國 鋒 的 英 明 、 能 幹 、 辦 事 能 力
華 國 鋒 符 合 接 班 人 條 件
華 國 鋒 在 某 某 地 區 工 作 時 ， 工 作 表 現
華 國 鋒 有 革 命 家 的 崇 高 品 格 等 等
G. Mac's Symbols
當 報 紙 把 華 國 鋒 的 名 字 與 毛 澤 東 聯 在 一 起 ， 相
提 並 論 ， 或 者 把 華 國 鋒 與 毛 澤 東 的 特 有 符 號
連 緊 在 一 起 時 ， 便 應 歸 於 此 項 ， 例 子 如 ：
華 國 鋒 是 毛 主 席 親 自 選 定 的 接 班 人
毛 主 席 對 華 國 鋒 表 示 無 限 的 支 持 及 信 心
毛 主 席 對 華 國 鋒 同 志 說 ， 你 辦 事 ， 我 放 心 ， 等
華 國 鋒 在 湖 南 跟 從 毛 主 席 作 某 某 活 動 等
毛 主 席 和 華 國 鋒 同 志 一 起 . . . （ 例 如 抗 日 、
出 征 、 和 敵 人 鬥 爭 - 等 等 ）
華 國 鋒 是 毛 主 席 紅 旗 的 捍 衛 人 等 等
華 國 鋒 徹 底 執 行 毛 主 席 的 指 示 、 路 線 、 等
華 國 鋒 繼 承 了 毛 主 席 的 過 去
其 他 把 華 國 鋒 、 毛 澤 東 連 在 一 起 的 情 況
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H. Others （ 其 他 ）
當 報 紙 上 提 及 了 華 國 鋒 的 名 字 ， 而 又 未 能 適
當 地 歸 納 在 上 列 七 項 主 題 之 下 時 ， 使 把
它 放 在 這 一 項 內 。
第 十 六 至 十 八 項 ： Mao's Quotes （ 毛 澤 東 講 的 話 ）
報 紙 上 時 常 有 直 接 引 用 毛 澤 東 的 講 話 、 語
錄 、 指 示 等 來 表 達 信 息 。 當 某 篇 文 章 中 有 任
何 直 接 引 用 這 些 語 錄 或 指 示 時 ， 使 仔 細 分
析 這 句 語 錄 的 內 容 每 性 質 。 照 後 歸 納 於
下 列 三 項 中 的 其 中 一 項 。
注 意 ： 報 紙 第 一 版 右 上 角 的 《 毛 主 席 語 錄 》
亦 當 一 段 語 錄 來 分 析 。
A: Pragmatic （ 實 務 性 質 的 ）
例 如 ： - 團 結 起 來 ， 以 大 局 為 重
農 業 學 大 塞 、 工 業 學 大 虔
要 馬 列 主 義 ， 不 要 修 正 主 義 ； 要 團 結 、 不 要 分 裂 ，
要 光 明 正 大 ， 不 要 搞 陰 謀 詭 計
毛 澤 東 有 關 農 業 、 科 技 、 工 業 及 社 會 主 義
建 設 的 講 話
三 項 紀 律 ， 八 項 注 意 ， 或 其 他 強 調 紀 律 的 說 話
要 相 信 百 份 之 九 十 的 幹 部 是 好 的
對 華 國 鋒 說 ┌ 你 辦 事 ， 我 放 心 ┘
你 們 要 注 意 呢 ， 不 要 搞 幫 派 … 搞 幫 派 要 摔 跤 的
不 要 搞 四 人 幫 ， 你 們 不 要 搞 了 ， 爲 什 麽 照 樣 搞 呀
把 我 國 建 成 一 個 強 大 的 社 會 主 義 國 家
政 治 和 經 濟 的 統 一 、 和 科 技 的 統 一 、 是 毫
無 疑 義 的
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B.Radical （ 激進性質的 ）
例 如 階 級 鬥 爭 是 纲 ， 其 餘 的 都 是 同
政 治 是 統 帥 ， 是 靈 魂
大 道 黨 內 走 資 本 主 義 的 當 权 派
走 資 派 還 在 足 . . . 走 資 派 就 在 党 內 . .
把 無 產 階 級 革 命 事 業 進 行 到 底
進 行 革 命
千 萬 不 要 忘 記 階 級 和 階 級 鬥 爭
現 在 思 想 上 的 一 條 重 要 戰 線 ， 就 是
對 修 正 文 章 的 批 判
翻 案 不 得 小 心
不 鬥 爭 就 不 能 進 步
要 防 止 資 本 主 義 復 辟
教 育 必 須 為 無 產 階 級 政 治 服 務
C CHuers (其他）
如 果 毛 澤 東 所 講 的 話 是 中 進 的 ， 或 是 不 涉 及 上 述
兩 項 政 治 路 線 的 ， 便 把 之 歸 在 此 項
例 如 ： 要 學 習 愚 公 移 山 的 精 神
只 有 人 民 ， 才 是 創 造 歷 史 的 原 動 力
全 世 界 人 民 的 正 義 鬥 爭 ， 都 是 互 相 支 持 的
CODER:
























1. South China Morning Post, Xianggang, February, 1976.
2. Paris AFP news dispatch in English, rebruary 7, 1976, as
reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily
Report on People's Republic of China (FBIS-CHI) No. 27,
February 9, 1976.
3. New China News Agency (NCNA) dispatch in English, February
7, 1976, as reported in the FBIS-CHI No. 17, February 9, 1976.
4. Renmin Ribao, Beijing, February 8, 1976.
5. Beijing Review, Beijing, February 13, 1976, Vol. 19, No. 7, p. 3.
6. Beijing NCNA dispatch in English, April 7, 1976, as reported
in FBIS-CHI No. 68, April 7, 1976.
7. Ibid.
8. NCNA (Beijing), October 22, 1976, as reported by the FBIS-CI
October 22, 1976,E. 1.
9. Guangming Ribao, Beijing, November 24, 1976, o. 1.
10. Ibid.
11. Renmin Ribao, Beijing, October 9, 1976.
12. AFP (Xianggang) October 9, 1976, as reported by the FBIS-HI
October 12, 1976, 11.
13. Ibid.
14. APP (Xiangga,ng) October 13, 1976, as reported in the FEIS-CHI
October 13, 1976, E. 4.
15. KYODO (Tokyo), October 15, 1976, as reported in the FEIS-CHI
October 15, 1976, E. 3.
16. AFP (Paris), October 15, 1976, as reported in the FBIS-CHI
October 15. 1976. E. 4.
93
17. London The Daily Telegraph, October 12, 1976, as reported
in the FBIS-CHI October 12, 1976, E. 15-
18. CNA (Taibei) October 13, 1976, as reported in the FBIS-CHI
October 13, 1976, E. 4.
19. AFP (Xianggang), October 21, 1976, as reported in the
FBIS-CHI October 21, 1976, E. 4.
20. Renmin Ribao, December 17, 1976, p. 1.
21. Ibid.
22. For a more in-depth treatment on this subject, read Leonard
L. Chu, 1984 in 1977 in The Asian Messenger, Vol. 2 No. 2
(Spring 1977), Centre for Communication Studies, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong, pp. 42-43.
23. Ting Wang, Jiang ding and the Cou d'etat in Beijing, Xianggang,
1976, p. 12. (Name of publisher not given).
24. Ting Wang, Organizational and Personnel Issues During the
Cultural Revolution Contemporary China Research Institute,
Xianggang, 1970), p. 45 and Lu Yixien, The Red Flag Incidence
and the Propaganda Department in the Cheng Ming, monthly,
Xianggang, No. 14, December 1978, p. 32.
25. Central Broadcasting Department Criticism Group, People's
Broadcasting Could Not be Abused, in a Collection of Articles
in Criticisin the Gana of Four (Goin t ublications, Xianggang,
1977 pp. 159-167.
94
CHAPTER II AN ANALYTICAL FRAMI4JORK FOR LEGITIMACY
1. David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life (John Waley
and Sons, Inc., New York, 1965) p. 279.
2. Zhao Lingyang, Legitimacy of Governments in China (Xianggang:
Xuejing Publishing Co., 1976).
3. Ibid., p. 72.
4. Easton, op. cit., D. 287.
5. Ibid., p. 302.
6. Ibid., p. 298.
7. Ibid., p. 304.
8. Wenwei Bao (Xianggang), January 10, 1969. During and after
the climax of the Cultural Revolution, there had been many
articles in the Chinese newspapers which reflected the popularity
of Mao cult in China. For a general text, read Lucian W.Pye,




1. Christa von Plettenberg, The Press of the People's Republic
of China, (M.A. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1968), p. 66.
2. Wilbur Schramm, Godwin C. Chu and Frederick T.C. Yu, China's
experinece with Development Communication: How Transferrable is
It? in Godwin Chu, Fred Hung, Wilbur Schramm, Stephen Uhalley, Jr.,
and Frederick T.C. Yu (Ed.), Communication and Development in
China (Communication Monographs No. 1, Fast-West Centre,
Fast-West Communication Institute, 1970), p. 93.
3. Towards the end of 1978, more and more emphasis was placed
on the Four Modernizations by the Chinese Government. And
Deng Xiaoping announced in November 197 that major struggle
against the supporters of the Gang of Four would be concluded
by the end of 1978.
40 Charles Osgood, The Representational Miodel and Relevant
Research Eethod in Ithiel de Sola Pool (Ed.), Trends in





I. Renmin Ribao, July 21, 1977.
2. Renmin Ribao, December 26, 1976.
3. Renmin Ribao, Editorial, February 7, 1977.
4. Renmin Ribao, November 28, 1976.
5. Renmin Ribao, November 14, 1976.
6. Guangming Ribao, January 30, 1977.
7. Renmin Ribao, December 22, 1976.
8. Renmin Ribao, November 9, 1976.
9. Renmin Ribao, November 10, 1976.
10. Ibid.
11. Guangming Ribao, January 16, 1977.
12. Renmin Ribao, May 1, 1977.
13• The average daily references for each month were obtained by-
dividing the total monthly references by the number of newspaper issues
sampled for that month. The monthly references could not be used
directly because the number of newspapers sampled for each month
were not the same. The newspapers were sampled on a weekly basis,
so at times five issues'of newspapers were sampled from a month,
while in other cases only four issues of newspapers were sampled
from a month. There were 15 months in each of which four issues of
newspapers were sampled, and 21 months in each of which five issues of
newspapers were sampled. Subsequent references to daily average
or daily average references were computed similarly.
14. A. Doak Barnett, Round One in China's Succession: The Shift
towards Pragmatism, Current Scene, Vol. XV, No. 1 (January 1977)
p. 10.
15. Preamble, The Constitute of the People's Republic of China
(Adopted on March 5, 1978 by.the 5th National People's Congress
of the PRC at its 1st Session), (Beijing: Foreign Language
Press), 1978, p. 2.
97
16.. Friedrich Carl J., Man and His Government: An Empirical
Theory of Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963Y, P. 243.
17. ,.An article entitled Population Growth Must be Controled
in Renmin Ribao, May 15, 1979 said that the population in China
has reached to 900 million or even more.
18. Renmin Ribao, December 1, 1976 p. 2.
19. Renmin Ribao, November 28, 1976, p. 4.
20. Renmin Ribao, October 22, 1976, p. 1.
21. Renmin Ribao, November 10, 1976, p. 1.
22. Ting Wang, China News Analysis in Ming Po (Xianggang),
October 21, 1979, p. 9.
23. Guangmiin Ribao, March 11, 1979.
24. Peter Nan-shong Lee, The Gang of Four: Radical Politics and
Modernization in China, in Steve S.K. Chin (Ed.) The Gang of
Four: First Essays After the Fall, (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian
Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1977), p. 70.
25. Ibid., p. 95.
26. Ibid., P. 70.
27. Ting Wang, China News Analysis in Ming Po (Xianggang),
October 21, 1978, p. 14.
28. Harry Harding, Jr. China After Mao, in Problems of Communism,
Vol. XXVI, (March-April 1977), p. 16.
29. Barnett, OP. cit., p. 3.
98
CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
1. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Comm unication in Totalitarian Socities',
in Ithiel de Soli Pool and Wilbur Schramm (Ed.), Handbook of
Communication (Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Chicago,
1973), pp. 462-511.
2. Lucian W. Pye, Communications and C inese Political Culture,
in Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII No. 3, March 1978 p. 244.
3. Mao Zedong, In Refutation of 'Uniformity of Public Opinion',
in Selected Works of Mao Tsetung Vol. V (Foreign Language Press,
Peking, 1977) p. 172.
99
A SEXTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Berelson, Bernard. Content Analysis in Communica ti on Research.
New York: uafner Publishing Company, 1971.
Buzek, Antony. How the Communist Press Works. London and Dunmoow:
Pall Mall Press, 1964
Carl, Friedrich J. "political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic
Power in Journal of politics, Vol. 23 p. 3-24
Carl,Friedrioh J. Man and His Government: An Emoirical Theory of
Politics. New York: McGraw Hill, 1963.
Chin, Steve S.K. (ed.),The Garg of Four First Essays After the
FALL. Selected Seminar Papers on Contemcorary China, II.
Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Korg,
1977
Chu, Godwin C, Philip Cheng and Leonard L. Chu. The Roles of
Tatzepao in the Cultural Revolution: A Structural-Functional
Analysis. Carbondale, Ill.: South Illinois University, 1972.
Chu, Godwin, Fred Hung, Wilbur Schramm, Stephen Uhalley, Jr., and
Frederick T.C. Yu. Communication and Development in China.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1977.
Chu, Godwin C. Radical Change Through Communication in Mao's
China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1977.
Chu, James C.Y."The Training of Journalists in Communist China",
in Journalism Quarterly vol. 42 No.3, Autumn 1972.
Chu, Leonard L., idwin C. Chu,"Mass Media and Conflict Resolution:
An Analysis of Letters to Editor. Paper presented at. the
Conference on "Communication and Cultural Change in China",
East-West Communication Institute, East-Vest Centre,
January 3-7, 1978.
Cohen.,D.L."The Ccncept of Charisma and the Analysis of Leadership", in
Political Studies, Vol. 20, 1972.
Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John
Wiley Sons, Inc., 1965.
Gerbner G., Holsti 0., Krippendorff K., Paisley W., Stone P. The
Analysis of Communication Content. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1969.
Harding, Harry Jr. China After Mao, in Problems of Communism
March-April 1977 Vol. XXVI pp. 1-18.
100
Holsti, Ole R. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.
Hegedus, Andras. Marxist Theories of Leadership and Bureaucracy : A
Marxist .Approach in Farrel, (ed.), Political Leadership in
East Europe and the Soviet Union, 1970.
Houn, Franklin W. Chinese Communist Control of the Press in
Public Opinion (quarterly Vol. XXII, Winter 1950-59, No. 4.
Houn, Franklin N. To Change a Nation: Propaganda and Indoctrination
in Communist China. New York: Crowell Collier, 1951 .
Joint Publishing Co. (Hong Kong). A Collection of Articles on
Criticising the tang of Four. Hong Kong, 1977. Vol. I- IV .
Liao Kuang-sheng. Mass Media and Klass Mobilization in the Cultural
Revolution, 1966-68 in Journal of the Chinese University of
Hong Kong, Vol. IV No. 1, 1977,pp. 130-153.
Lieberthal, Kenneth. Central Documents and Politburo Politics in
China (Michigan papers in Chinese Studies No. 33). Centre
for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1978.
Lindbeck, John N.H. (ed.), China: Management of a Revolutionary
Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971.
Liu, Alan P.L. The Press and Journals in Communist China. Cambridge,
Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966.
Liu, Alan P.L. Communications and National Integration in
Com,unist China. Berkeley University of Californai Press, 1971.
Liu, Alan P.L. Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist
China. Santa Barbara, California: Clio Books, 1976.
Liu, Alan P.L.Public Opinion in Communist China. Paper presented
at the Conference on Communication and Societal Integration
in China. East-West Communication Institute, January 1-7, 1977,
East-West Centre, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Meyer, Alfred. Historical Development in the Communist Theory of
Leadership in Farrel B. (ed.), political Leadership in
Easton Europe and the Soviet Union, 1970.
Mueller, Claus. The Politics of Communication: a Study in the
Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimacy.
London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Oksenberg, Michel C. Communications in the Chinese Bureaucracy.
Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong
Kong, 1972.
101
Orate, Andres D. Hua Kuo-feng and the Arrest of the Gang of Four,
The China Quarterly No. 75, September 1978 pp. 540-565.
Pletterberg, Christa von. The Press of the People's Republic of
China. M.A. Thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1963.
Pool, Ithiel de Sola. Communication in Totalitarian Socities in
Pool and Schramm, (ed.), Handbook of Communication. Chicago:
Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1973.
Pye, Lucian W. (ed.), Communications and Political Development.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963.
Pye, Lucian (ed.), Political Culture and Political Development.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965.
Pye, Lucian W. The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psycho-cultural
Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development.
Cambridge: M. I . T. Press, 1968.
Pye, Lucian W. Communications and Chinese Political Culture,
in Asian Survey, Vol. VIIII No. 3, March 1978 pp. 221-246.
Rogowski, Ronald. Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political
Support. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974.
Schram, Stuart R. (ed.), The Political Thought of %Iao Tze-tong.
New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1963.
Schram, Stuart P. Mao Tze-tung. Penguines Political Leaders of
the Twentieth Century series. Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin Books, 1966.
Solomon, Richard H. The Chinese Political Culture and Problems of
Modernization. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964.
Starr, John B. tdeolog,r and Culture: An Introduction to the Dialectic
of Contemporary Chinese Politics. New York: Harper & Row, 1973.
Ting,Wang. (ed.), A Compilation of dress Articles of Peking's
News Policy during the Cultural Revolution. Hong Kong:
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1973.
Ting, Nang. Trends in China: Leadership Realignments in Problems
of Communism. July-August 1977 Vol. XXVI pp. 1-18.
Ting Wang. Hua Kuo-feng, Chi Teng-kuei and a New Generation.
Hong Kong: Published by Ming Pao Monthly, 1977.
walker, Richard L. "China's Post-Mao Foreign Plicy" in Problems
of Communism, March-April 1977 Vol. XXVI pp. 71-74.
Wu, Yuan-li. "Press Regulations in China," Far Eastern Economic
Review, Vol. XXIV, Jnauary 16, 1958
Yu, Fedrick T.C. "Campaigns, Communications, and Development
in Communist China". In Communication and Change In the
Developing Countries, Lerner and Schramm (ed.)1967
Yu, Fedrick T.C Mass Persuasion in Communist China, New York:
Frederich A. Praeger, 1964.
Zhao, Lingyang. The Legitimacy of Governments in China. Hong
Kong: Xuejing Publishing Company, 1977.











Foerign Broadcasts Information Service Daily Report on the People's
Republic of China
( 北 京 評 論 )
( 光 明 日 報 )
( 紅 旗 )
( 明 報 )
( 人 民 畫 報 )
( 人 民 日 報 )
( 新 聞 戰 線 )
103
Journalism Quarterly
Problems of Communism


